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The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November
2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for nancial rms with which he had a connection.
This return was about 6% after the rst full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading
days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected rms when news broke
that Geithners conrmation might be derailed by tax issues. Excess returns for connected rms
may reect the perceived impact of relying on the advice of a small network of nancial sector
executives during a time of acute crisis and heightened policy discretion.
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1 Introduction
On Friday, November 21, 2008, the news leaked that Timothy Geithner  then president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York would be nominated by President-elect Barack
Obama to become Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. Over the next ten trading
days, nancial rms with a connection to Geithner experienced a cumulative abnormal return
of about 12% (relative to other nancial sector rms). When Geithners nomination ran into
trouble in January 2009, due to unexpected tax issues, there was a fall in the value of Geithner-
connected rms although this e¤ect is smaller and less precisely estimated than the increases
that were observed in November. How should we interpret these results?
This pattern seems unlikely to be a uke of the data or a result of mismeasurement. We use
three di¤erent ways of identifying connections between nancial institutionsexecutives and
Geithner: (i) executives who had meetings with Geithner during 200708; (ii) executives who
belonged to the same nonprot boards and groups as Geithner; and (iii) executives of rms
located in New York City, who would be close in proximity to the New York Fed. Our results
are essentially the same across all three measures of connections (although somewhat weaker
for the New York City measure), and they are robust across a wide range of checks, including
with various size controls and when we drop outliers.
Our results are also unlikely to reect higher than normal returns for rms most a¤ected
by the crisis and thus more likely to benet from the appointment of a competent Treasury
Secretary. The results remain robust when we compare connected rms to non-connected rms
with similar size, protability, leverage and prior stock price behavior, or when we control for:
how intensely rms were a¤ected in the most severe phase of the crisis during September
October 2008; how their stock price rose when capital was injected into big banks in October
2008; or how much they were exposed to troubled assets (in particular, residential mortgage-
backed securities). Episodes of purely supportive policy  such as the Bear Stearns rescue,
the AIG bailout, or the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act did not cause
the same robust pattern of abnormal returns for Geithner-connected rms. We also examine
evidence on the market-perceived probability of bankruptcy from credit default swap spreads,
although the available sample for these data is smaller than for equities. We nd the same
pattern in CDS spread data as in equity data i.e., there was a perceived benet to creditors (in
the form of lower implied default risk) when the rmsexecutives were connected to Geithner.
There are at least three reasons why market participants may have expected benets for
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Geithner-connected rms. First, they may have expected that some form of explicit corruption
could take place. In countries with weak institutions and much policy discretion in the hands
of politicians, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, or Pakistan, potential corruption is a reasonable
interpretation of stock price movements for politically connected rms.1 But corruption is
not plausible as an explanation for what happened in the United States. Econometric results
that show large e¤ects for political connections are typically based on data from countries
with weak institutions. In contrast, by most measures and at most times, the United States
has fairly strong institutions. Moreover, Geithner is widely regarded as an honest public
servant who is very unlikely to have acted on the basis of personal nancial gain. Studies of
policymaking under the Obama administration by Suskind (2011) and Scheiber (2011) and rst-
hand accounts by Bair (2012) and Barofsky (2012) none of which are particularly sympathetic
to Geithner contain absolutely no suggestion of corruption. Geithner has also never run for
public o¢ ce and seems unlikely to ever do so, making political contributions irrelevant.2
Second, market participants may have believed that Geithners policy preferences were
generally consistent with the interests of the nancial institutions with which he was connected.
This might have represented a type of cultural capture of key o¢ cial decision-makers and
thinkers byWall Street (Bhagwati (1998), Johnson and Kwak (2011)). According to this theory,
instead of favoring rms because he had connections with them, Geithners prior connections
had already shaped his perspectives on the nancial sector and on the crisis that was still
unfolding. In particular, his close connections to large, complex, Wall Street banks might have
persuaded him that broader economic prosperity required rescuing those banks on relatively
generous terms (for shareholders, as well as executives and creditors). Our results, however,
are not based on a comparison of nancial to non-nancial rms or of large relative to small
nancial rms.3 Rather, as already noted, they are driven by a comparison of connected to
non-connected rms of similar size. Even if Geithner took the worldview that Wall Street
1For example, in a seminal study, Fisman (2001) found that being connected to President Suharto accounted
for 23 percent of rmsvalue on average in Indonesia in the mid-1990s (where the events were rumors about the
presidents health). For Malaysia in the late 1990s, Johnson and Mitton (2003) found that connections to Prime
Minister Mahathir accounted for around 20 percent of rmstotal stock market value in a crisis, where the event
was the fall from power of Anwar Ibrahim, the Minister of Finance. Similar results are found in Pakistan by
Khwaja and Mian (2005), in a cross-country setting by Dinç (2005), and in Weimar Germany by Ferguson and
Voth (2008).
2Duchin and Sosyura (2012) nd that politically connected rms were more likely to receive TARP funds,
and also that such rms performed worse than non-connected rms. However, they measure connections to
Congress, not to Secretary Geithner.
3Similarly, we show below that our results are not driven by Citigroup or other nancial rms that are
considered by policymakers or markets as too big to fail. In all cases, we nd that investors considered there
to be value in being personally connected to Geithner, quite aside from any too big to fail issues.
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banks were too big to fail, this cannot directly account for our results.
Third, the market may have subscribed to a social connections meets the crisishypothesis:
that connections would matter during a time of crisis and increased policy discretion. It was
perhaps reasonable to suppose that immediate action with limited oversight would have to be
taken, and that o¢ cials would rely on a small network of established condantes for advice
and assistance. Powerful government o¢ cials are no di¤erent from the rest of us; they know
and trust a limited number of people. It is therefore natural to tap private sector friends,
associates, and acquaintances with relevant expertise when needed including asking them for
advice and hiring them into government positions. Even with the best intentions, beliefs are
presumably shaped by self-interest, particularly when the people involved were, are, or will
be executives with duciary responsibility to shareholders. These tendencies can be checked
during ordinary times by institutional constraints and oversight, but during times of crisis and
urgency, social connections are likely to have more impact on policy.4
Our ndings show a stronger e¤ect for connections than is standard in most related research
on the United States.5 In part, previous studies have examined di¤erent kinds of connections,
focusing on the legislature, where the impact of a single individual is likely to be limited. For
example, the so-called Je¤ords E¤ect named after a Senator who switched parties unexpect-
edly, causing a change of control in the U.S. Senate was found to be worth around 1% of rm
value (Jayachandran (2006)). Roberts (1990) found statistically signicant but small e¤ects on
connected rms from the unexpected death of a U.S. Senator. Fisman et al. (2012) studied the
value of connections to former Vice President Dick Cheney, driven by events such as his heart
attacks, surprise news about his political career, the original Bush-Cheney hanging chad
4Particularly important may have been Geithners connections through his long-term relationship with
Robert Rubin, who was Treasury Secretary in the Clinton administration, a former co-chair of Goldman Sachs,
and more recently a leading board member at Citigroup (he resigned from the latter position in January 2009).
From November 2003, Geithner was president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York an institution that
has traditionally served as the eyes and ears of the Federal Reserve on Wall Street, but which is sometimes con-
sidered to have become too much inuenced by the thinking at large nancial institutions. Formal responsibility
for supervision rests with the Board of Governors in Washington D.C., but the New York Fed is very much
engaged in collecting information and interpreting what is going on. By tradition, the president of the New York
Fed plays a particularly important role in managing relationships between government o¢ cials and nancial
services executives who are based in New York (Wall Street, broadly dened). He is also, by convention, vice
chair of the Federal Open Market Committee, which sets monetary policy. (All presidents of the New York Fed
to date have been men.)
5Akey (2013) presents ndings that are similar in magnitude to ours, but for congressional elections where
the wedge between rms connected to a winning politician and rms connected to a losing politician is 1.7%
to 6.8% of rm equity value. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) nd that when George W. Bush won the
presidency in 2000 (and Republicans controlled the Senate and the House of Representatives), Republican-
linked rms gained 3%-5% relative to Democrat-linked rms, but the links they measure are not exclusive to
the executive branch.
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presidential election victory in 2000, and Iraq war developments, and found no evidence of sig-
nicant e¤ects. They concluded: Contrary to conventional wisdom, we nd that in all cases
the value of ties to Cheney is precisely estimated as zero. We interpret this as evidence that
U.S. institutions are e¤ective in controlling rent-seeking through personal ties with high-level
government o¢ cials.6
But Geithner ascended to the highest level of power at an unusual moment, with many
ideas in ux and great di¤erences of opinion between otherwise well-informed and experienced
people.7 During the intense crisis of 2008 there was a wide range of opinions among policy
experts  and among potential Treasury Secretaries  regarding what should be done, with
signicant potential implications for shareholders and creditors of nancial institutions.
During such an episode where immediate action is necessary, it is plausible that the usual
institutional checks may not work and social connections may become more important as
sources of both ideas and manpower.8 This interpretation is also consistent with recent work
by Querubín and Snyder (2013). Using a regression discontinuity approach, they nd that
American politicians were not able to enrich themselves before or after the U.S. Civil War, but
during the war there were substantial opportunities for personal gain either because there
was more government spending or because news media were distracted or both.
Section 2 reviews the historical context and why market participants may have expected
connected rms to potentially perform better. Section 3 explains our coding of connections
and discusses the other variables we use. Section 4 presents our basic results and a range of
robustness checks. Section 5 analyzes the e¤ects of Geithners tax issues, which temporarily
jeopardized his nomination in January 2009. Section 6 discusses the design and implementation
of bailout policy and nancial reform under the Geithner Treasury. Section 7 concludes. The
Online Appendix (Tables A1 through A10) contains additional results and details on the data.
6Lower down the o¢ cial hierarchy, there is certainly more rent-seeking behavior. For example, Dube, Kaplan
and Naidu (2011) nd that (leaked) credible private information on coup attempts backed by the United States
does move stock prices.
7There has always been lobbying in the United States, but other evidence suggests this may have been more
intense during the recent boom and bust, as the stakes became very high. Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2011)
nd that lobbying of legislators by lenders was associated with more risk-taking before the crisis and worse
outcomes in 2008, while Igan and Mishra (2012) examine how the political inuence of the nancial sector
a¤ected deregulation. Mian, Su, and Trebbi (2010) establish that members of Congress were more likely to
support the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 when they received higher contributions from the
nancial services industry. Tahoun (2013) nds that members of Congress own stock in rms that contribute
to their campaigns, and that such rms receive more in government contracts.
8Faccio (2006) nds connections of various kinds exist everywhere. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006)
show connected rms are more likely to receive bailouts across a wide range of countries, but the probability of
bailout is much lower in richer countries. See also Chiu and Joh (2004) and Dinç (2005).
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2 The Context and Event
2.1 Historical Context
The nancial crisis rst became clearly evident in mid-2007 when problems with subprime
mortgages began causing major losses at some hedge funds and structured investment vehicles.
The crisis grew in severity during the spring and summer of 2008 culminating in the collapse
of Lehman Brothers and a full-blown nancial panic in mid-September.
These developments prompted Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke to propose what eventually became the Emergency Economic Stabi-
lization Act (EESA), whose centerpiece was the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP).9 On October 14, 2008, using this legal authority, the Treasury Department, the Fed-
eral Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announced two measures
that began to calm the markets. First, they revealed that $250 billion of TARP money was
available to recapitalize nancial institutions and, of this amount, $125 billion had already
been accepted by nine major banks. Second, there would be a program under which the FDIC
guaranteed new debt issued by banks.10 By mid-November, however, when President-elect
Barack Obama was selecting his Treasury Secretary, the crisis was far from over.
2.2 Channels of Inuence
Why might market participants have believed that the nomination of Timothy Geithner as
Treasury Secretary would be good for Geithner-connected rms relative to non-connected
rms? There are two potential channels of inuence that do not appear to operate. The
rst possibility is some form of expected material compensation. One possibility could be
outright corruption, in which rms or their lobbyists pay o¢ cials directly for favors. As we have
already emphasized, there is no plausible evidence to suggest that the Geithner appointment
could have implied corruption. Geithner is known to be honest and the United States has
tough anti-bribery rules that remained e¤ective even during the nancial crisis.
9On September 18, 2008, Paulson and Bernanke provided a dramatic brieng to congressional leaders. Ac-
cording to Chris Dodd, then chair of the Senate Banking Committee, they were told that were literally maybe
days away from a complete meltdown of our nancial system, with all the implications here at home and glob-
ally. David Herszenhorn, Congressional Leaders Stunned by Warnings,The New York Times, September 19,
2008. The initial Treasury proposal, published on September 20, was only three pages long and did not specify
any independent oversight mechanisms. Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan,The New York Times, Sep-
tember 20, 2008. The initial legislative proposal was rejected by the House of Representatives on September 29.
An amended version passed and was signed into law on October 3, 2008.
10Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC,Treasury Department Press Release, October
14, 2008, available at www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081014a.htm.
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Another potential form of compensation is campaign nancing, which sometimes matters
a great deal in the United States  particularly when elected o¢ cials have a sense of what
might encourage individual and corporate contributions to their campaigns. Geithner was
unelected and has never sought election, so such considerations are unlikely to be relevant in
his appointment or later decisions.
Material compensation also motivates the so-called revolving door between the public
and private sectors, in which government o¢ cials are friendly with rms they oversee and
subsequently  or perhaps consequently  secure lucrative positions with those rms. Yet
before his nomination to Treasury, Geithner already had ample opportunity to land highly
lucrative jobs in the private sector. It seems implausible to suggest that he was motivated 
or that anyone would think he could be motivated by potential employment opportunities.
Second, there may well have been some cultural capture at the Treasury and in the
Obama administration, meaning the convergence of perspectives and interests that occurs
through immersion in a certain social or institutional context (e.g., working at the New York
Fed or being friends with high-prole nanciers). Once in o¢ ce, this shared mindset could
lead o¢ cials to decisions that favor the entire nancial sector or perhaps some particular rms,
such as Wall Street banks. This is a plausible hypothesis in general, but the specic evidence
we present below cannot be explained by such cultural capture our results indicate abnormal
returns for well-connected nancial rms relative to other less well-connected rms with similar
characteristics, including size, protability, leverage, and prior stock market performance.
One channel of inuence that market participants in November 2008 could reasonably have
expected to apply relates to the role of social connections. Access to government o¢ cials
can be hugely benecial, as witnessed by the large U.S. lobbying industry. When powerful
politicians make decisions, they may be inuenced by the people they talk to and the people
with whom they talk will likely be the people they know (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi
(2011), and Blanes-i-Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012)). In addition to the simplest form
of direct access through social connections i.e., the fact that any o¢ cial is more likely to take
a phone call from someone he knows than from a person he does not know another form
of indirect access is provided by hiring. Any new administration must ll a large number of
important positions, and connections are an inuential factor in hiring decisions.
By November 2008, Geithner knew the leaders of the New York nancial community very
well, and it could reasonably be expected that he would continue to take their calls and listen
to them seriously as Treasury Secretary. He would also be expected to place people he knew
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and trusted into important positions.11 Even if Geithner were not to favor connected rms
directly, they could still benet through the inuence of their alumni.
The social connections meets the crisishypothesis implies that market participants might
expect Secretary Geithners appointment to favor nancial institutions based on pre-existing
professional and social connections. Such positions might become even more valuable when
policy discretion is higher and very consequential decisions need to be made such as during
the nancial crisis that was raging in November 2008.
2.3 Policy Discretion in November 2008
As of November 2008, Congress had already explicitly granted broad powers to Treasury to
intervene in the nancial sector, and Secretary Paulson had pressured nine major banks into
accepting $125 billion of new government capital.12 Although Paulsons Capital Purchase
Program (CPP) distributed capital on relatively generous terms, access was tightly controlled
by Treasury. In late October, for example, PNC acquired National City after National City
learned that its CPP application might not be approved.13 At the time, there was little
transparency about how applications were reviewed and what criteria were being used to
determine which banks received capital. The Treasury Department determined who received
the benet of both cheap capital and a government seal of approval (Veronesi and Zingales
(2010)).14
In addition, the Capital Purchase Program placed signicant holdings of preferred stock in
the hands of the Treasury Department, as well as warrants on common stock. Although the
preferred stock was non-voting and Treasury committed not to vote its shares of common stock,
11We should emphasize that drawing on pre-existing relationships on Wall Street is well-established practice
for a Treasury Secretary, and did not begin with Geithner. For example, Henry Paulson brought in more and
more Goldman Sachs alumni as the crisis deepened, including Neel Kashkari, who was charged with running
TARP. Because of his expertise, Kashkari was initially kept on by Geithner.
12Damian Paletta, Jon Hilsenrath, and Deborah Solomon, At Moment of Truth, U.S. Forced Big Bankers to
Blink,The Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2008.
13Dan Fitzpatrick, David Enrich, and Damian Paletta, PNC Buys National City in Bank Shakeout,The
Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2008.
14The investment terms were considerably more favorable than those available from the private sector, such
as in Warren Bu¤etts investment in Goldman Sachs. According to Bloomberg, the government received war-
rants worth $13.8 billion in connection with its 25 largest equity injections; under the terms Bu¤ett got from
Goldman, those warrants would have been worth $130.8 billion. In addition, TARP received a lower interest
rate (5%) on its preferred stock investments than did Bu¤ett (10%). Mark Pittman, Paulson Bank Bailout in
Great StressMisses Terms Bu¤ett Won,Bloomberg, January 10, 2009. The TARP Congressional Oversight
Panel had similar ndings. TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, February Oversight Report: Valuing Trea-
surys Acquisitions,February 6, 2009, available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT47178/pdf/CPRT-
111JPRT47178.pdf. Although there were justications for this subsidy in particular, Treasury wanted broad
participation in order to avoid stigmatizing particular banks it still constituted potential expected value that
the government was willing and able to transfer to specic nancial institutions.
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this still left open the prospect of increased government inuence; participating institutions
were also subject to executive compensation and corporate governance requirements.15 The
mechanics of implementing TARP were run within Treasury, giving signicant discretion to
the Treasury Secretarys appointees.16
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of all rms trading on the NYSE or NASDAQ that are categorized as
banks or nancial services rms in the Datastream database. Of these 678 rms, we exclude
those that lack su¢ cient stock return data in the Datastream or TAQ databases to calculate
abnormal returns for our Geithner announcement event. The remaining sample of 603 rms
we refer to as the full sample.
A potential complication is the Citigroup bailout which occurred between the news leak of
Geithners expected nomination on November 21 and the o¢ cial announcement of his nomi-
nation on November 24, 2008. On Sunday, November 23, the U.S. government entered into a
bailout agreement with Citigroup that provided Citigroup with a $20 billion capital infusion
through TARP, as well as guarantees on a pool of $306 billion of troubled assets.17
Because the bailout occurred in the middle of the event window for the Geithner announce-
ment, and because the bailout (or at least the size and timing of the bailout) was not entirely
anticipated, it could complicate estimation of the e¤ect of the Geithner announcement at
least to the extent that there is correlation between rms connected to Geithner and rms
impacted by the Citigroup bailout news.18 In our tests, we address this issue in two ways.
First, we report results for stock price reactions on November 21 only, which is prior to the
Citigroup bailout announcement. While this approach avoids the confounding e¤ects of the
15TARP Capital Purchase Program: Senior Preferred Stock and Warrants, available at on-
line.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/PublicTermSheet1014.pdf.
16 In addition to Neel Kashkari, Reuben Je¤rey, another Goldman alumnus, was named as interim chief
investment o¢ cer, and several other ex-Goldman executives played important roles in the Paulson Treasury.
Julie Creswell and Ben White, The Guys from Government Sachs,The New York Times, October 17, 2008;
Deborah Solomon, The Financial Crisis: Amid Turmoil, Tireless Team Of Advisers Backed Paulson,The Wall
Street Journal, September 17, 2008.
17Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC on Citigroup,November 23, 2008, available
at www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20081123a.htm
18 It is not certain that a bailout would be positive news for Geithner-connected rms. We have tested the
e¤ect of Geithner connections on returns surrounding another signicant government bailout, the bailout of
Bank of America on January 16, 2009. The Bank of America bailout was similar in structure to the Citigroup
bailout, and conrmed the governments willingness to take unprecedented measures to keep the largest banks
aoat. However, our tests show that cumulative abnormal returns for Geithner-connected rms surrounding
the Bank of America bailout are statistically insignicant, which suggests that Geithner-connected rms do not
generally have positive responses to the news of signicant government bailouts of major banks.
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Citigroup bailout, it is not entirely appealing because the post-leak return on November 21 is
only one hour in length, and because some uncertainty about the nomination remained until
the o¢ cial announcement on November 24.
As a second approach, we exclude from our tests the rms that would be most likely to
be a¤ected by the bailout announcement. We rank all rms in the sample based on their
return correlation with Citigroup during the period beginning the day of the Lehman collapse
and ending the day before the Geithner nomination announcement. We drop rms that rank
among the top 10% in correlation with Citigroup, and call this reduced sample our base
sample.19 To a large degree, the use of this base sample should eliminate the impact of the
bailout announcement on our estimates.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of our variables for political connections and nancial
data. We identify connections to Geithner in three di¤erent ways. The rst measure of
connections, which we refer to as schedule connections, identies the number of times that
Geithner interacted with executives from each rm while he was president of the New York Fed.
We identify these interactions by searching Geithners daily schedule for each day from January
2007 through January 2009.20 For example, a search of Geithners schedule for Moodys
Corporation reveals two interactions between Geithner and executives of Moodys. On July 5,
2007, the schedule reads, 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Meeting w/Raymond McDaniel, Chairman
& CEO, Moodys Corporation, and on September 15, 2008, the schedule reads 11:00 a.m.
to 12:00 p.m. Rating Agencies Meeting and Raymond McDaniel is listed as one of the
participants. Based on this information, we code Moodys schedule connections as two. Row
1 of Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for this variable. By far the rm with
the greatest number of interactions listed on Geithners schedule is Citigroup, with a total of
34. Panel A of Appendix Table A1 lists all of the sample rms found on Geithners schedule
and the number of interactions. The average number of schedule connections, conditional on
a rm having at least one connection, is 4.96.
The second measure of connections to Geithner, which we refer to as personal connec-
tions, identies the number of links that Geithner has with each rm through personal rela-
tionships. We identify these links using the relationship maps published by muckety.com (run
19We have also constructed the base sample by dropping rms that rank in the top 5% and in the top 20%
of those correlated with Citigroup. Our main results remain unchanged, although in the latter case only seven
rms remain in the treatment group.
20Geithners Calendar at the New York Fed, The New York Times, available at
documents.nytimes.com/geithner-schedule-new-york-fed.
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by independent journalists).21 The maps on muckety.com show the links for a given individual
to other people or to organizations.22 We count a link between Geithner and a rm if he has
a personal link with a person who is a director of the rm, or if he shares a board or similar
position (e.g., trustees of the Economic Club of New York) with someone who works for the
rm.23 We require that those links be active when Geithners nomination was announced.
For example, we nd a link between Geithner and American Express on muckety.com
through Kenneth Chenault, chairman and CEO of American Express, who is associated with
Geithner through the National Academy Foundation, where they are both directors, and
through the Partnership for New York City, where Chenault is a vice chairman and Geithner
is a board member. Based on this information we code personal connections for American Ex-
press as one. Descriptive statistics for this variable are reported in Row 2 of Table 1. Geithner
has the greatest number of personal connections (nine) to Citigroup; in contrast, he has only
one connection to Bank of America. The average number of personal connections to Geithner,
conditional on a rm having at least one connection, is 2.24. Appendix Table A2 lists all of
the identied personal connections between Geithner and sample rms.
To independently verify the accuracy of the information provided by muckety.com, we
searched the annual reports of each company with an identied personal connection to Gei-
thner, as well as other publicly available information. We were able to verify 52 of the 58
connections reported by muckety.com, 45 of those using the annual report led most im-
mediately subsequent to the Geithner nomination announcement (typically, for years ending
December 31, 2008), and another seven using other sources such as Forbes and Bloomberg. Of
the remaining six connections, two are conrmed to be errors and are excluded from our data.
The other four are identied as legal counsel for nancial rms in the sample. These have also
been excluded from our data due to the di¢ culty of verifying the connection and because of
the di¤erent nature of the connections. These exclusions leave us with a set of 52 personal
connections to Geithner from 21 di¤erent nancial rms (although ve connected people each
have two board links to Geithner). Panel B of Appendix Table A1 lists these rms and their
connections.
21These data are broadly similar to what is available for emerging markets, e.g., Gomez and Jomo (1997,
1998) on Malaysia. Many connections in emerging markets are formed early in careers. Most of the Geithner
connections are from his time at the New York Fed. We use muckety.com relationship maps from March 2009.
22Measuring connections in ths way is standard in the network sociology literature. See, for example, Useem
(1984). Fisman et al. (2012) review the sociology literature on why board ties matter, including for the ow of
information.
23Most of our data are board memberships, which are a matter of public record. However, the muckety.com
coding also contains some well-known mentor/adviser relationships, with Robert Rubin and a few others.
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The third measure of connections to Geithner is based on rm location, under the reasonable
assumption that Geithner would have greater contact with executives of rms headquartered
in New York City, where Geithner was located as president of the New York Fed. This measure
is a dummy variable set equal to one if the headquarters of the rm is identied as New York
City in the Datastream database. Descriptive statistics are reported in Row 3 of Table 1.
Forty-ve of the sample rms have headquarters in New York City; these rms are listed in
Appendix Table A3. All other sample rms not listed in Appendix Table A3 are listed in
Appendix Table A4.
As is shown in Appendix Tables A1 and A3, there is some overlap in the three measures
of connections. Of the 63 rms that have some measure of connections, nine are connected
according to all three measures, ten are connected according to two of the three measures,
and 44 are connected according to only one of the measures. In subsequent analysis, when
regressions include our standard control variables, the number of connected rms becomes 22
(schedule), 20 (personal), and 41 (New York) due to missing data on control variables. In
addition, when we focus on our base sample the number of connected rms is 12 (schedule), 8
(personal), and 34 (New York).
Rows 4 through 6 of Panel A of Table 1 report basic nancial information for the sample
rms as obtained from the Worldscope database for the year 2008. Size (Row 4) is reported
as the logarithm of total assets, protability (Row 5) is return on equity, and leverage (Row
6) is the ratio of total debt to total capital. Rows 7 through 9 report summary statistics for
our primary measure of rm performance, cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) the
calculation of which is discussed in the next section. Rows 10 through 12 report statistics
for our secondary measure of performance, percentage changes in credit default swap (CDS)
spreads, which is also covered in the next section.
Panel B of Table 1 reports di¤erences in the means of these variables between rms con-
nected to Geithner and non-connected rms; here his schedule and personal connections are
converted to a dummy variable equal to one for rms that have any connection. Row 13 of Panel
B shows that connected rms are signicantly larger than non-connected rms for all three
measures of connections. Row 14 shows that protability is signicantly lower for connected
rms, but only when we use the New York measure. Row 15 shows that leverage is higher for
connected rms, but the di¤erence is only signicant for the schedule measure of connections.
Panel C repeats the analysis of Panel B for the base sample. The di¤erences reported in Panel
C are broadly similar to those in Panel B. Because of the performance di¤erences shown in
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Panels B and C, we control for these variables below. Finally, Panel D of Table 1 reports
correlation coe¢ cients between the explanatory variables reported in Panel A.
4 Geithner Connections and Stock Returns
In this section we study whether connections to Geithner, as dened in the previous section,
are associated with di¤erences in returns at the time of the announcement of Geithners nom-
ination. We begin by calculating returns for each rm in the sample on the relevant dates.
Geithners nomination was o¢ cially announced by President-elect Barack Obama early on
Monday, November 24, 2008. However, news of his impending nomination was leaked to the
press late in the trading day on Friday, November 21, 2008 at approximately 3:00 p.m. ET 
a time that coincides with the beginning of a stock market rally.
For the purposes of studying stock price reactions, we dene event day 0 as November 21 and
event day 1 as November 24, with subsequent event days corresponding to subsequent trading
days. We obtain daily stock returns for each sample rm from the Datastream database. In
order to more precisely delineate the response to the Geithner announcement on event day 0,
we calculate returns on that day as only the returns from 3:00 p.m. until the market close at
4:00 p.m. We obtain intraday returns from the TAQ database.
4.1 Univariate Tests
Panel A of Table 2 compares actual returns between connected and non-connected rms in the
base sample for event days 0 through 10. Panel A shows that on event day 0, using schedule
connections, connected rms outperformed non-connected rms by 4.3 percentage points, a
di¤erence that is signicant at the 5% level. Results are similar for the other measures of
connections, though not statistically signicant for personal connections. On event day 1, when
the nomination was o¢ cially announced, return di¤erences are even more pronounced. Using
the schedule measure, connected rms outperformed non-connected rms by 8.4 percentage
points on this day. The corresponding outperformance for rms with personal connections is
9.6 percentage points, and for rms with New York connections it is 3.1 percentage points.
The di¤erence for the schedule and personal connections is signicant at the 1% level, while
for New York it is signicant at the 10% level.
Panel A also shows that connected rms continued to outperform non-connected rms on
each day through event day 10, with the primary exception being event day 5.24 The nal row
24The underperformance of connected rms on event day 5 (a day when there was a sharp market down-
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of Panel A reports cumulative performance for event days 0 through 10. Using the schedule
measure of connections, connected rms outperformed non-connected rms by 37.1 percentage
points over this period. For personal connections the di¤erence was 46.3 percentage points,
and for New York connections the di¤erence was 29.9 percentage points. By any measure of
connections, the outperformance of connected rms over this period was economically large
and highly statistically signicant.
Because there were large market movements during the event window, it is important to also
calculate abnormal returns for the event days. Our procedure for calculating abnormal returns
follows Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). We calculate cumulative abnormal returns using





where CAR[0; n]i is the cumulative abnormal return for rm i for event days 0 through n.
ARit is calculated as
ARit = Rit   [^i + ^iRmt];
where ARit is the abnormal return for rm i on event day t, Rit is the actual return on rm i
for event day t, and Rmt is the return on the market for event day t, with the market return
represented by the return on the S&P 500 index. The parameters ^i and ^i are estimated
from the following equation:
Rit = i + iRmt + "it;
on a pre-event period of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. Although the
choice of estimation period length is subjective, a length of 250 days corresponds to roughly
one year of trading and has been used in other studies such as Jayachandran (2006) and Li
and Lie (2006). The cumulative abnormal returns show the actual returns of each rm less the
predicted returns of each rm based on that rms performance relative to the market over the
estimation period.25
Panel B of Table 2 compares cumulative abnormal returns between connected rms and
non-connected rms in the base sample for event days 0 through 10. In contrast to the actual
returns reported in Panel A, no signicant di¤erence is reported between CARs of connected
rms and non-connected rms for the one hour of event day 0. Beginning on event day
turn) applies only to actual returns. In terms of abnormal returns (discussed below), there is no signicant
underperformance of connected rms on event day 5.
25We also calculated abnormal returns using a three-factor model, but the improvement in t relative to the
market model was negligible.
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1, the di¤erences in CARs between connected rms and non-connected rms are relatively
large, but not statistically signicant. Signicant di¤erences in CARs increase on subsequent
event days. The nal row of Panel B shows that using the schedule measure, CAR[0; 10] for
connected rms is higher than CAR[0; 10] for non-connected rms by 15.7 percentage points.
The corresponding di¤erences for the other measures are 15.8 percentage points and 11.0
percentage points, and in all cases the di¤erence between the CARs is signicant at the 1%
or 5% level. We repeat the analysis of Table 2 for the full sample and report those results in
Appendix Table A5. The results are fairly similar to those reported for the base sample.
Table 2 shows strong performance of connected rms relative to non-connected rms in
response to Geithners nomination as Treasury Secretary. In the tests that follow, we assess
whether these results hold when controlling for other rm characteristics in a multivariate
setting.
4.2 OLS Regression Results
To control for additional characteristics of the sample rms, we rst test the relationship
between connections to Geithner and cumulative abnormal returns in a regression framework.
We estimate the following equation:
CARi = + xi + z
0
i+ "i; (1)
where CARi is either CAR[0], CAR[0; 1], or CAR[0; 10] for rm i, xi is a measure of connec-
tions for rm i, and zi is a set of rm-level covariates for rm i (such as rm size, protability,
and leverage).
The rm-level covariates are included to control for other basic rm characteristics that
could have some e¤ect on the observed relationship between connectedness and returns. A
common practice in regressions of this type in previous literature is to not control for rm-
level characteristics (see, e.g., Fisman (2001), Jayachandran (2006), Fisman et al. (2012)),
although Johnson and Mitton (2003) control for rm size and leverage and Jayachandran
(2006) controls for rm size in robustness checks.
Results from such regressions could be confounded, however, by the di¤erential e¤ects of
events following Geithners nomination on rms with di¤erent characteristics. For this reason,
in the regressions that follow we control exibly for a range of rm-level characteristics 
and, as a further step in this direction, we will also report results from various matching
estimators. In particular, rm size is included as a control because if Geithner had more
14
interaction with larger rms and Panel B of Table 1 indicates that this is the case then the
observed performance of Geithner-connected rms could be due to their size rather than to
their connections. Protability is also an important control because it is an indicator of how
hard each rm had been impacted by the crisis, and it is possible that the rms that had been
hit the hardest also had the most to gain from Geithners appointment. Finally, leverage is
included as an additional indicator of the vulnerability of each rm during the crisis. For all of
these variables, we include cubics i.e., the level, square, and cubed value so as to account
for potential non-linear e¤ects.
There might be other factors causing correlation of error terms (residual returns) across
rms. Unadjusted OLS standard errors would be biased in this case and could be too low.
To adjust for this possibility, we estimate adjusted standard errors that account for potential
cross-rm correlation of residual returns. We estimate the covariance matrix of returns using
pre-event return data on a window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day
0. This estimated covariance matrix is then used to calculate our standard errors, under the
assumption that the pre-event covariance matrix is an appropriate estimate of the covariance
matrix during the event. These adjusted standard errors should account for observed cross-
sectional correlation of returns between rms in our sample (see Greenwood (2005); Becker,
Bergstresser, and Subramanian (2013)). We use these adjusted standard errors below.
Table 3 reports results of the estimation of equation (1). The adjusted standard errors
are reported below coe¢ cients in parentheses. The three measures of Geithner connections
(schedule, personal, and New York) are tested in turn. Although there is no established
standard in the literature for the appropriate length of the event window, we follow the practice
of rst reporting results for shorter event windows (CAR[0] and CAR[0; 1]) and then a longer
event window (CAR[0; 10]). The rst three columns of the table report results for the full
sample with CAR[0] as the dependent variable  the Citigroup bailout occurred after the
rst trading day and thus correlation with Citigroup is not a concern when we use CAR[0]. In
Column 1 the coe¢ cient on schedule connections is 0.0033, which indicates an abnormal return
of over 0.3% for each additional connection and is statistically signicant at the 1% level. So,
for example, a rm with a number of connections equal to the sample average, conditional
on being connected (4.96 connections in the full sample), would have had an abnormal return
of roughly 1.6% on average, relative to non-connected rms during the last hour of trading
on November 21. The coe¢ cient on personal connections is signicant at the 5% level and
indicates an abnormal return of over 0.7% for each additional personal connection, which also
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implies a similar average abnormal return of about 1.6% for the average connected rm (which
has 2.24 personal connections in the full sample). The coe¢ cient on New York connections is
signicant at the 10% level and indicates that rms with New York connections had abnormal
returns of 1.3% relative to non-connected rms.26
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 3 report results for CAR[0; 1]; focusing on the base sample.
The coe¢ cients on schedule connections and personal connections are both positive and signif-
icant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on schedule connections indicates that
each additional interaction with Geithner during his tenure at the New York Fed is associated
with an abnormal return of 1.1% for event days 0 and 1 combined. This implies an abnormal
return of about 3.5% for the average connected rm (which has 3.16 schedule connections in
the base sample). The coe¢ cient on personal connections indicates an abnormal return of 5.0%
for each additional personal connection between Geithner and the rm, and thus an abnormal
return of about 8.8% for the average connected rm (which has 1.75 personal connections in
the base sample). The coe¢ cient on New York connections is not statistically signicant.
The last three columns of Table 3 report results for the estimation of equation (1) on the
base sample with CAR[0; 10] as the dependent variable. In these three columns the coe¢ cient
on Geithner connections is positive for all measures and signicant at the 1% level for the
personal and New York measures. Compared to the quantitative magnitudes for CAR[0; 1],
the coe¢ cients on the personal and schedule measures are similar, but the coe¢ cient on the
New York measure is much larger, showing an abnormal return of 10.8% for connected rms.
In summary, Table 3 reports economically meaningful and statistically signicant cumula-
tive abnormal returns for Geithner-connected rms following the announcement of his nomi-
nation as Treasury Secretary, for both short and long event windows.27
4.2.1 Robustness Checks for OLS Results
We perform additional tests to assess the robustness of our baseline results reported in Table
3, and these are presented in Table 4. In this table and in others that follow, we suppress
reporting of the coe¢ cients of control variables for brevity, although we always include the
control variables (up to cubics in size, protability, and leverage) in all specications. To save
space we do not report results for New York connections in this table.
26We do not report results for the base sample for CAR[0], but the corresponding coe¢ cients in the base
sample are positive for all three measures and statistically signicant for the New York measure.
27We do not report results for the full sample for CAR[0; 1] and CAR[0; 10], but the corresponding coe¢ cients
in the full sample are generally larger and more precisely estimated than those reported for the base sample.
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We rst address the question of whether Geithner-connected rms performed well after the
announcement of his nomination because of their personal connections to Geithner or because
Geithners appointment represented a signal that economic policy would be sensible. We get
at this question in four ways.
Our rst set of robustness checks controls for the vulnerability of rms to the macroeco-
nomic conditions prevailing at the time. These include the extent to which rmsstock prices
declined in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
as a measure of how badly a rm might have su¤ered from the uncertainty or the re sales
that a further collapse could have triggered (and that Geithners policies might have been
anticipated to mitigate). Specically, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return starting on
the day of Lehmans bankruptcy (Monday, September 15, 2008, is day 0 for this event) and
for the following four days, which comprises the entire trading week.
As a second way to measure crisis vulnerability, we control for whether the rm is a deposit-
taking institution, as such institutions may have di¤ered in vulnerability to the crisis from other
nancial rms. Using Worldscope data, we create a dummy variable for positive deposits.
Finally, we also control for whether rms had already received TARP funding prior to the
announcement of Geithners nomination, which can act as another proxy for the systemic
importance of a rm. TARP-approved rms were unlikely to collapse.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report results controlling for all three of these proxies for crisis
vulnerability. The results are similar to our baseline results, with the exception that results for
CAR[0; 10] are somewhat weaker (Panel C). The coe¢ cients on the proxies for crisis vulnera-
bility (not reported in the table) are not always statistically signicant in the regressions, but
the coe¢ cients on the Lehman bankruptcy CAR and the deposit-taking dummy are generally
negative, and the coe¢ cient on the TARP-funding dummy is generally positive.
In Columns 3 and 4 we control for how rms responded to the announcement in early Oc-
tober that TARP funds would be used to recapitalize large banks. This decision was generally
regarded as the best of the available alternatives so the response to this announcement o¤ers
another plausible way to control for how rms were a¤ected by sound policy decisions. This
decision was made public on Monday, October 13, with the announcement just after the stock
market closed although it followed a meeting of top bankers at the Treasury Department
that was public knowledge. Similar European recapitalization plans had been unveiled over
the weekend, and this further contributed to the expectation that something similar would
happen in the United States. We calculate CAR[0; 1] for this event with October 13 as day
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0 and October 14 as day 1. Columns 3 and 4 show that controlling for this variable in our
regressions does not alter the main results. The e¤ect of being connected to Geithner remains
statistically signicant.
As a third approach we recalculate abnormal returns using an estimation window that is
focused on the turbulent period surrounding Lehmans collapse so our measure of expected
returns uses betas that reect the response of each rm to market movements during this par-
ticular period. We calculate abnormal returns as described above, except that the estimation
period begins two weeks prior to the Lehman collapse (Monday, September 1, 2008) and ends
three weeks after the Lehman collapse (Friday, October 3, 2008), when Congress ultimately
approved EESA (which included TARP). Results using this measure of abnormal returns are
reported in Columns 5 and 6. The results show that the coe¢ cients on Geithner connections
are signicant across all three panels in this specication and are all larger in magnitude than
the coe¢ cients in our baseline results.
As a fourth approach, in Columns 7 and 8, we control more directly for the exposure of
nancial rms to toxic assets. We measure exposure to toxic assets using data from Erel,
Nadauld, and Stulz (2013). We use their measure of holdings of mortgage-backed and asset-
backed securities (scaled by total assets) compiled from the Consolidated Financial Statements
for bank holding companies, as reported by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. We use
data as of December 2008, and the variable is available for only 196 insured banks in our
sample. When controlling for this variable, the coe¢ cient on Geithner connections is highly
signicant in all three panels. The coe¢ cient on toxic assets (not reported in the table) is
always positive and usually signicant.28
In our next robustness checks we test for the inuence of the largest rms and extreme
observations on our results. Although we control exibly for rm size throughout our analysis,
in Columns 9 and 10 we take another approach by limiting the sample to only the top size
decile of sample rms, thereby creating a subsample that is more homogenous in terms of size.
The coe¢ cient on Geithner connections is positive and statistically signicant in four out of
six cases in this subsample.
In Columns 11 and 12 we exclude rms that the administration deemed to be of systemic
importance, in that they were later included in the government-administered stress tests. The
28We have also examined the e¤ect of including interactions between our various measures of exposure to a
further decline in asset prices (i.e., the control variables in Columns 1 through 4 and Columns 7 and 8) with the
Geithner connection variable. There are in general no robust and consistent interaction e¤ects between these
exposure variables and connections to Geithner.
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rms that the government included in the stress tests (i.e., the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program, SCAP) were those viewed in early 2009 as systemically important by the administra-
tion and thus may have been more likely to benet from bailouts similar to the one provided
to Citigroup or from other policies.29 These estimates are positive and signicant in all but
one case. In Columns 13 and 14 we check for the inuence of outliers by excluding rms
with extreme CARs, dened as those larger than the 99th percentile or smaller than the 1st
percentile. The Geithner coe¢ cient is signicant in all but one case in this specication.
As an additional robustness test, we consider whether results obtained for the schedule
measure of connections are robust when we calculate the number of connections using only
Geithners appointments from the year 2007. By 2008, the initial stages of the crisis were un-
derway, so Geithner may have had an increased number of meetings during this time with rms
a¤ected by the crisis. Using only 2007 appointments as the schedule measure of connections
puts the focus on pre-crisis relationships. The results using the 2007 measure are reported in
Column 15. As with our baseline results, the coe¢ cient on schedule connections is signicant
at the 1% level for CAR[0] and CAR[0; 1], but not for CAR[0; 10].
To summarize, in the robustness checks in Table 4 the Geithner connection coe¢ cients gen-
erally retain statistical signicance, although there are some exceptions. The magnitudes of the
coe¢ cients vary but are often larger than those reported in the corresponding baseline results
in Table 3. Table 4 indicates the positive relation between Geithner connections and abnormal
returns surrounding his nomination announcement is fairly robust in OLS specications.30
We also estimate similar results using various matching estimators. This includes propen-
sity score matching estimators in which rms were matched just on size; on primary control
variables (size, protability and leverage); and on primary control variables plus other con-
trol variables (TARP participation dummy, deposit-taking dummy, and the CAR surrounding
the Lehman collapse). It also includes a nonparametric matching estimator, which estimates
the impact of connections on cumulative abnormal returns separately across 64 cells created
according to the covariates values and then combines them using the inverse standard errors
29This excludes the following 17 rms from our sample: American Express, Bank of America, BB&T, Bank
of New York Mellon, Capital One, Citigroup, Fifth Third Bank, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Key Corp.,
Morgan Stanley, PNC Financial Services, Regions Financial, State Street, SunTrust, U.S. Bancorp, and Wells
Fargo. The other two SCAP participants, GMAC and MetLife, are not part of our sample.
30To briey summarize the results for the unreported New York measure of connections, it is statistically
signicant (with the expected sign) in the following specications: in Panels A and C when controlling for crisis
vulnerability, in Panels A and C when controlling for the TARP capital injections, in all three panels when
using the Lehman collapse beta, in Panel B when controlling for toxic assets, in Panel C when using the top
size decile only, in Panels A and C when excluding systemically important rms, and in Panels A and C when
excluding outliers.
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of the estimates as weights. These results, which are reported in Appendix Table A6, show a
similar pattern to that found in our other robustness checks.
4.3 Synthetic Matching Methodology
The results presented so far  and most event studies of this type  implicitly assume that
the di¤erences between the treatment group (Geithner-connected rms) and the control group
(non-connected rms) can be captured by a combination of the excess return calculation and
the covariates included in the regression model. But connected and non-connected rms may
be di¤erent in other ways, which might be, at least partially, responsible for our results.
As a complementary approach to address these concerns, we turn to the method of synthetic
matching developed in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
(2009). The main idea of this method is to construct a synthetic match for each rm in the
treatment group (i.e., rms connected to Geithner) by using the rms in the control group in
such a way that the synthetic rm has similar behavior to the actual rm before the event of
interest. In contrast to the OLS results with exible controls and the propensity score matching
and nonparametric estimates discussed above, which compare rms that are similar in terms
of the covariates, this approach compares rms that are similar in terms of the behavior of
their pre-event abnormal returns.
The e¤ect of the event can be measured as a function of the di¤erence between the behavior
of the rm and its synthetic match after the event. Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2009)
show that a primary reason to use this method is to control for the e¤ect of unobservable
factors that have an impact on the common time trend in the treatment and control groups.
Most previous papers employ synthetic matching for the case of one entity in the treatment
group and one intervention. Since our sample includes many connected rms, we extend this
method for the case of many rms in the treatment group. As we explain below, inference is
based on condence intervals we construct from the distribution of the Geithner e¤ect for
placebo treatment groups on Geithners nomination.31
More formally, our synthetic matching procedure is as follows. First, we divide the rms
into treatment and control groups according to our measures of connections to Geithner. Then
we construct a synthetic match for each rm in the treatment group by solving the following
31These intervals are constructed for testing the hypothesis of whether the e¤ect of Geithner connections is
zero or not and are thus not standard condence intervals.
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optimization problem:













and 8j 2 Control Group;8i 2 Treatment Group wij  0;
where Rit is the daily return on date t and wij is the weight of control rm j employed in the
optimal weighting for rm i. It is important that the estimation window not include the period
of intervention and it is typically selected as some period prior to the intervention. As before,
we use 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to the Geithner nomination announcement as our
estimation window.32 The two criteria (
P
j
wij = 1 and w
i
j  0) imply the return for rms in
the treatment group belong to convex combinations of returns for rms in the control group.
After nding the optimal weights through iteration for each rm in the treatment group,




and the abnormal return is computed as the di¤erence between the actual return and the
synthetic rm return (cRit).
To estimate the e¤ect of intervention, we compute:















In the above formula, b( ; k) is the e¤ect of intervention at date  computed using cu-
mulative abnormal returns of dates [ ;  + k], 1= bi is a measure of goodness of the match in
the estimation window, and T is the length of the estimation window. This formula for the
average e¤ect of intervention on the treatment group is thus a weighted average formula, with
greater weight given to better matches. This is because the di¤erence between actual returns
32We nd that the main results are robust to using other estimation windows. The results are somewhat
stronger when we use estimation windows closer to Geithners nomination starting from September 2008.
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and synthetic rm returns should contain more information about the intervention when we
are better able to predict the return of the rms during the estimation window.
To construct the condence intervals, we randomly draw 5,000 placebo treatment groups
from the control group with each group having the same size as the real treatment group.
We compute the Geithner-connection e¤ect for these placebo treatment groups on event days,
and construct the condence intervals for hypothesis testing of whether the coe¢ cient is sig-
nicantly di¤erent from zero. The e¤ect of Geithner connections is signicant at 5% if it does
not belong to the interval that contains the [2.5, 97.5] percentiles of the e¤ect of the Geithner
connection for placebo treatment groups.
Table 5 presents the results from the synthetic matching estimation. Because synthetic
matching requires a dichotomous denition of the treatment and control groups, we also con-
sider two additional denitions of connections: highly connectedrms, which are dened as
those with more than two identied meetings with Geithner, and mildly connectedrms,
which are those with one or two identied meetings.33
Panel A of Table 5 presents results for the full sample in CAR[0], and Columns 1 through 3
present results for all Geithner schedule connections (highly and mildly connected). Column 1
reports standard OLS results. In order to be comparable to the synthetic matching results, the
connections variable is a dummy (equal to one for rms with any number of connections). We
continue to adjust the OLS standard errors for pre-event correlations between rms, and the
OLS regressions include cubics in size, protability, and leverage as before. Column 1 shows
that Geithner connections are associated with an abnormal return of 1.4% for the one-hour
return on day 0, and that this coe¢ cient is statistically insignicant. Below the coe¢ cient we
report the number of signicant coe¢ cients obtained at each signicance level when we test
the e¤ect of Geithner connections on 100 trading days between October 31, 2008, and April 7,
2009 (excluding key event dates), a period that does not overlap with our estimation period.
The number of signicant coe¢ cients on non-event days indicates the drawback of using OLS
i.e., the Geithner connections coe¢ cient is signicant more often than would be expected.
Column 2 presents the synthetic matching results as outlined above. The coe¢ cient on
33Appendix Table A7 reports the weights on rms in our control group for each rm in our treatment group.
Our control group includes synthetic matches based on the characteristics of over 70 rms. For example, in
the synthetic match for Bank of America, Wells Fargo contributes a weight of 0.30. But Wells Fargo is not a
particularly good match for other rms in our treatment group it contributes a weight of 0.19 for JPMorgan
Chase but not more than a 0.06 weight for any other rm. U.S. Bancorp contributes a weight of 0.41 for PNC,
but this is unusually high. The pattern for Citigroup is more common one rm contributes a weight of 0.21
to the synthetic match, another eight rms contribute weights of between 0.08 and 0.13, and one other rm has
a weight of 0.01.
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Geithner connections is smaller than in the OLS results and is not statistically signicant.
The number of signicant coe¢ cients shows that in the non-event-day tests, the Geithner
connections coe¢ cient is signicant with a frequency that is much closer to what would be
expected in theory (e.g., at the 5% level, four times in a test window of 100 trading days).
This makes us more condent that in the synthetic matching method we are isolating the true
e¤ect of Geithner connections rather than the e¤ect of some other correlation among Geithner-
connected rms (which would have led to more frequent rejections on non-event days).
Column 3 presents correctedsynthetic matching results in which for our inference proce-
dure we eliminate rms for which we do not have a good synthetic match, dened as the rms
in the control group with b more than p3 times the average b for the real treatment group
rms.34 Although the formula used in the synthetic matching method already gives greater
weight to rms with better matches, we present the corrected results as a robustness check
to ensure that our condence intervals are appropriate. The corrected results are similar to
the uncorrected results in Column 2. Columns 4 through 6 present a similar set of results
for the highly connected indicator, and Columns 7 through 9 for the mildly connected
indicator. As expected, the results are stronger for highly connected rms. Overall, Panel A
suggests that the e¤ect of Geithner connections on the one-hour day 0 returns is positive but
not statistically signicant once the synthetic matching adjustments are made.
Panel B of Table 5 repeats the tests of Panel A but for our base sample in CAR[0; 1]. These
tests show a much stronger e¤ect of Geithner connections, even in the synthetic matching
results. Column 2 shows that Geithner connections are associated with an abnormal return of
6.0%, which is economically sizable and statistically signicant at the 1% level. As expected,
the results are even stronger for highly connected rms relative to mildly connected rms.
Finally, Panel C repeats the results for CAR[0; 10]. The coe¢ cients in Columns 2 and
3 indicate a 12.4% abnormal return associated with Geithner connections. Once again the
matching estimate for highly connected rms is larger than for mildly connected rms.35 Taken
as a whole, Panels B and C show that the synthetic matching methodology conrms the
presence of a positive and signicant e¤ect of Geithner connections at horizons longer than the
34For both the schedule and personal measures, all connected rms have a relatively good synthetic match,
so the main e¤ect of changing the cuto¤ is to change the estimated condence intervals and not the estimated
coe¢ cient. We have tried various values for this parameter, including 1 (which eliminates all the rms withb larger than the average of b for rms in the treatment group ), p3, and values larger than p3. The larger
the cuto¤, the closer the estimates are to uncorrected synthetic matching. Our results are not sensitive to this
range of cuto¤ values.
35 In Panel C, the Geithner connections coe¢ cient tends to have more signicant coe¢ cients in the non-event-
day tests, relative to the shorter-horizon CARs.
23
one-hour day 0 returns.
4.3.1 Robustness Checks for Synthetic Matching
Table 6 presents robustness checks for the synthetic matching results, focusing on CAR[0; 1].
In Panel A, we use the nancial crisis estimation window (from September 1, 2008 to October
3, 2008) as reported above in the OLS robustness checks (see Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4). The
main results are similar to those presented in Panel B of Table 5. The primary di¤erence is
that the e¤ect is stronger for highly connected rms while it is no longer signicant for mildly
connected rms. Panel B uses the personal measure of connections. In these regressions the
coe¢ cient on Geithner connections is signicant at the 5% level for highly connected rms. (In
Panels B and D, highly connectedis dened as more than one connection because there are
fewer connections per rm using these denitions of connections.)
In Panel C, we use the New York measure of connections to Geithner. Again the results
show the estimated Geithner connection coe¢ cient is statistically signicant, although the size
of the coe¢ cient is smaller than with the other measures. This could be due to attenuation
bias since having headquarters in New York is a noisier measure of connections to Geithner.36
In Panel D we use just information from Geithners 2007 schedule to create the connections
variable and nd that the synthetic matching results are robust to this change.
In robustness checks not reported in the table, we have also examined whether our results
(OLS or synthetic matching) are dependent upon any single Geithner-connected rm. As the
number of Geithner-connected rms is relatively small, particularly in the base sample, it is
not surprising that in some specications the signicance of the results is altered when one
observation is excluded from the sample. We nd that the connected rm that has the most
impact when dropped from the sample is Blackstone Group. Geithners connections to Black-
stone were strong, as evidenced by his personal and schedule connections (see Appendix Table
A1) and by the fact that Peter G. Peterson (co-founder and Senior Chairman of Blackstone
until December 31, 2008) was chairman of the board of directors of the New York Fed when
Geithner was picked to head that institution. Excluding Blackstone Group from the sample
negatively impacts the signicance of the OLS results (but not the synthetic matching results)
for CAR[0,1] in the base sample, both because the point estimates change somewhat and
because condence intervals also widen when a connected rm is excluded from the sample.
36 In an additional robustness check, we repeated our analysis just within the sample of New York rms. In
this case again, Geithner-connected rms had signicantly higher abnormal returns.
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Excluding Blackstone has less impact on the CAR[0,10] results, and no impact on whether
coe¢ cients are signicant in the CAR[0] results or in the CDS results (reported in the next
section). Our robustness checks also show that there are occasions when excluding a particular
rm from the sample strengthens the results by making coe¢ cients that are otherwise insignif-
icant become signicant. Across all specications, the balance of the e¤ect from dropping
individual rms is roughly equal i.e., a handful of results become insignicant and a handful
become signicant. Our CDS results are not a¤ected by dropping any individual rm.37
Table 7 provides our rst falsication exercise. It investigates whether the positive re-
sponse of Geithner-connected rms is due to mean reversion of returns prior to the nomination
announcement, perhaps due to a Citigroup downturn preceding its November 2008 bailout.
We test whether Geithner connections were signicant in the days before the announcement
using, in turn, CAR[ 1; 0] in Panel A, CAR[ 5; 0] in Panel B, and CAR[ 10; 0] in Panel C.
In Columns 1 through 3 of Table 7 we present results for schedule connections. These columns
show that there is a negative trend for Geithner-connected rms prior to the announcement,
but none of the estimates is statistically signicant. In Columns 4 and 5 we present results
comparable to Column 1, but for personal and New York connections. Again, the pre-trend is
negative, but not statistically signicant except for CAR[ 10; 0] for New York connections.
In Figure 1 we show the pre-trend of the e¤ect of Geithner connections graphically. The
gure shows the coe¢ cient on Geithner connections for CAR[x; x+ 1] for each trading day x
in the month of November 2008. The coe¢ cients reported are synthetic matching results for
the base sample. Panel A shows results for all connected rms, and Panel B shows results
for highly connected rms. Each panel also reports condence intervals for hypothesis testing
for CAR[x; x + 1] at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Visually, the gures do not demonstrate any
consistent pattern of negative coe¢ cients prior to the nomination event, particularly in Panel B.
The gures also show that the nomination event stands out as the most statistically signicant
event during the period, being the only day with signicance at the 1% level. Panel B in
particular shows no pre-trend as the Geithner connection coe¢ cient lies inside the condence
intervals for the entire period before the nomination. Together, Table 7 and Figure 1 suggest
that the positive reaction of Geithner-connected rms to the nomination announcement was
not just a reversal of previous trends.
37As a robustness check, we also performed synthetic matching for CAR[0,1] for the sample of deposit-taking
rms and for the sample of non-deposit-taking rms separately. The resulting estimated coe¢ cients for the
Getihner connection are 6.7% and 6.0%; both are signicant at the 5% level.
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4.4 CDS Spreads
If the market perceived that benets would accrue to Geithner-connected rms from his ap-
pointment as Treasury Secretary, then the news of his nomination should have impacted not
just stock returns of connected rms but also the probability of default for connected rms 
as reected in their credit default swap spreads. If market participants expected that Geithner
or his associates could protect connected rms from bankruptcy or other trigger events, then
one would expect CDS spreads on the debt of connected rms to fall relative to non-connected
rms upon the Geithner nomination announcement.
Because data on CDS spreads are available for relatively few rms, we view CDS spreads as
a secondary measure of rm performance. We obtain CDS data from the data provider Markit
for every rm in the full sample with available data, which gives us a sample of 27 rms
for our CDS tests. Each rm has multiple CDS listings for various maturities and contract
specications. For our tests we use CDS contracts of ve-year maturities (the most common
tenor) on senior unsecured debt (the most common priority level) with modied restructuring
provisions (the most common provision). Summary statistics for CDS spreads are reported in
row 10 of Table 1. At the time of the Geithner nomination announcement, the average spread
among sample rms was 465 basis points, with a median spread of 233 basis points.
Table 8 reports estimations of equation (1) in which the dependent variable is the percentage
change in the CDS spread rather than the CAR in stock prices.38 (Summary statistics for
CDS spread changes are reported in rows 11 and 12 of Table 1). We report results only for
the full sample, with and without Citigroup, because there are not enough rms with CDS
data in the base sample to estimate the model. Panel A reports OLS results, rst for the
percentage change in CDS spreads on day 1, and then for the percentage change in CDS
spreads from day 1 to day 10. Results are not reported for day 0 because of the unavailability
of intraday quotes on CDS spreads. Included but not reported in the regressions are the
same control variables from previous regressions. As in the CAR results, the standard errors
in these regressions are adjusted for pre-event correlations between rms. Panel A shows
that for all three measures of connections the coe¢ cient on Geithner connections is negative
whether Citigroup is included or not and for both return horizons. In the rst ve columns,
the coe¢ cient is statistically signicant. The negative coe¢ cient is as predicted, in that the
Geithner nomination is associated with a reduction in the premium required for insurance on
38Percentage changes in spreads are more appropriate as the dependent variable than are raw changes in
spreads because the magnitude of spreads varies widely among rms, particularly during the crisis period.
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the debt of Geithner-connected rms. As an example of interpretation of the magnitude of these
e¤ects, the coe¢ cient of -0.014 in Column 1 indicates that each additional schedule connection
is associated with a 1.4% drop in a rms CDS spread on day 1. For an average-spread rm
with ve schedule connections, this would imply a fall of 33 basis points.
Panel B of Table 8 reports synthetic matching results. Again the coe¢ cient on Geithner
connections is negative in all cases, and it is statistically signicant in all but two cases. In
some specications the estimated e¤ects are particularly large. For example, in Column 9, the
coe¢ cient of -0.203 indicates that New York connections are associated with a 20.3% drop in
a rms CDS spread from day 1 to day 10 (about 99 basis points for an average-spread rm).
In short, the results in Table 8 are complementary to the results for stock returns and are
supportive of the hypothesis that the market expected benets for Geithner-connected rms
when the Geithner nomination was announced.
4.5 Additional Falsication Checks
As additional falsication checks, we investigate the e¤ect of signicant positive and negative
 news about economic policy on Geithner-connected rms at moments when Geithner did
not have the same amount of inuence as he could have been presumed to have as Treasury
Secretary. We also look at the implications of Henry Paulsons earlier nomination as Treasury
Secretary, and the value of connections to other candidates at the time of Geithners nomination
event.
First, we perform the same procedure as we do for the Geithner nomination event, but
for other event windows. Specically, we examine the e¤ect of the Bear Stearns rescue and
purchase by JPMorgan Chase in March 2008. If Geithner-connected rms are di¤erent from
others and tend to respond more to certain types of nancial or macroeconomic policy, we
may expect them to outperform others during this event window also. In particular, in this
instance, there was market concern that the failure of Bear Stearns would cause market dis-
ruption or some form of contagion. The Federal Reserve became involved in helping JPMorgan
acquire Bear Stearns, including by providing some insurance against losses that might occur
on mortgage-related securities.39
However, we nd no bump up for Geithner-connected rms on or after Monday, March 17,
2008 (the purchase was announced on March 16). This is consistent with the notion that even
39As president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Geithner was closely involved in the details of this
deal and the presence of Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan, on the board of the New York Fed raised some
eyebrows at the time.
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as head of the New York Fed, Geithner was operating within a constrained environment with
strong oversight including by the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C. In addition, the
overall macroeconomic situation was not viewed as dire as it became in fall 2008. There was
little sense that a major crisis was approaching.
In a similar vein, we also look for a statistically signicant gain in value for Geithner-
connected rms when AIG received support in September 2008, when Congress struggled to
pass emergency economic legislation in late September and early October 2008, and when
capital injections to big rms were announced shortly afterwards. In none of these instances
did Geithner-connected rms show signicant di¤erential gains relative to other rms using
the synthetic matching methodology.40
We also examine the connections of Henry Paulson, the previous Treasury Secretary, ap-
plying the same method of identifying personal connections. His only identiable connection
on muckety.com is with Goldman Sachs where Mr. Paulson spent most of his career. On
the day of Paulsons announcement (May 30, 2006), Goldman Sachs stock fell by 2.0% (the
S&P 500 fell by 1.6% that day), and in the 10 days following the announcement, Goldman fell
by 5.2% (the S&P fell by 3.3%). Clearly this is only one observation, but Paulsons appoint-
ment (during an economic boom) did not appear to have a positive e¤ect on his connections,
consistent with the idea that connections matter more during crisis periods.
Finally, we study the reaction of rms linked to other leading candidates for the position of
Treasury Secretary. If some unobservable characteristic makes some rms both more likely to
be connected to Geithner and also more likely to perform well during our event window, then
we might expect the same characteristic to lead to greater connections to other candidates. If
connections to other candidates also matter during the event window, this would raise questions
about our interpretation. Our results in this section do not indicate such a pattern.
After Geithner, the next leading candidates in the week prior to the announcement were
Lawrence Summers, Jon Corzine, Paul Volcker, and Sheila Bair.41 As of November 15, 2008,
40There was no stock market rally on the day EESA/TARP passed Congress (October 3, 2008); the S&P
return was -1.4% that day. There was a large decline on the day that TARP did not pass the House (September
29, 2008), with the S&P down -8.8%. In calculating the response to capital injections, we exclude rms that
received direct injections of capital.
41There are reasons why people might have expected some other candidates to follow di¤erent policies as
Treasury Secretary  policies that might have been less favorable to the types of nancial rms with which
Geithner was connected. For example, Corzine, despite having served as chair of Goldman Sachs in the 1990s,
was now the favored candidate for at least part of the labor movement. Bair favored a narrower loan guarantee
program than Geithner in October, and also eventually supported the sale of Wachovia to Wells Fargo while
Geithner preferred Citigroup as a buyer. Bair also advocated for relatively more assistance for homeowners
and relatively less for nancial institutions. Volckers primary reputational attribute was the idea that he was
willing to make hard choices for the good of the country, including inicting pain when necessary, a reputation
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the probabilities of each candidate obtaining the job, according to Intrades prediction market,
were 45% for Geithner, 26% for Summers, 10% for Corzine, 9% for Volcker, and 8% for Bair.42
We follow the procedure discussed above, using data from muckety.com, to nd personal con-
nections to rms for these candidates. We list the rms connected to the other candidates and
the nature of those connections in Appendix Table A8.
We conduct OLS regressions to test the e¤ect of connections to all candidates on cumulative
abnormal returns following the Geithner announcement.43 We employ the full sample in these
tests in order to retain a reasonable number of connections to the other candidates (although
we continue to exclude Citigroup from the regressions). Results of these tests are reported in
Table 9. The rst three columns report results with CAR[0; 1] as the dependent variable. For
purposes of comparison, Column 1 reports coe¢ cients for Geithner connections alone. Column
2 reports the result with the measures of Summers, Corzine, Volcker, and Bair connections
included. The coe¢ cient on Geithner connections remains signicant the coe¢ cient increases
from 0.020 to 0.023 and the standard error increases from 0.005 to 0.010. The coe¢ cients on
connections for Summers and Corzine are positive but not signicant.44 The coe¢ cients are
negative for the other two candidates.
In Column 3, we create a combined connections variable this is a dummy variable equal
to one if a rm is connected to either Summers, Corzine, Volcker, or Bair. When included in
a regression with the Geithner connection variable, this variable is small and positive but far
from signicant (coe¢ cient of 0.002 with a standard error of 0.007). The Geithner connections
coe¢ cient remains signicant: a coe¢ cient of 0.017 with a standard error of 0.010.45
In the nal three columns of Table 9 we repeat the same structure of regressions but with
the percentage change in CDS spreads as the dependent variable (this is a small sample and
we do not have data on any Bair-connected rms). The coe¢ cient on Geithner connections
earned in combating high ination during the early 1980s. Although he had worked for Chase Manhattan in the
1950s and 1960s, and had been president of the New York Fed in the 1970s, by 2008 he was considered highly
independent of any inuence.
42James Pethokoukis, Geithner Tops Odds for Next Treasury Secretary,U.S. News & World Report, No-
vember 15, 2008.
43There is no straightforward equivalent of the synthetic matching approach in this case because there are
multiple connections (treatments).
44One might expect a negative reaction of Summers-connected rms because these rms did not get a Treasury
Secretary with which they had connections. But this expectation is clouded by two factors. First, because
Geithner and Summers have interacted with people in similar circles, there is a large overlap between Geithner
connections and Summers connections (correlation = 0.87). Second, on the day of Geithners announcement as
Treasury Secretary, Barack Obama also announced Summers as his choice for director of the National Economic
Council. Summers would still have been expected to have major inuence over economic decisions.
45We nd similar results when we include connections to other potential candidates one by one, but this is a
less compelling specication from a theoretical perspective, and we do not report the details here.
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is negative and signicant in Columns 4, 5, and 6, again indicating that the market expected
benets specically for Geithner-connected rms.
When included separately, the coe¢ cients are positive and signicant for Corzine- and
Volcker-connected rms; the coe¢ cient on Summers-connected rms is negative but not signif-
icant.46 When we combine all non-Geithner connections in Column 6, this variable is positive
(and thus opposite-signed) and signicant. In this case, the Geithner e¤ect is twice the magni-
tude as in Column 4 (-0.070 compared with -0.035), although the standard error also doubles,
reecting some degree of multicollinearity in the smaller CDS sample.
Overall, the falsication exercises reported in this subsection do not suggest that we are
spuriously capturing the reaction of Geithner-connected rms to major events (unrelated to
the nomination of Timothy Geithner). Nor are we picking up the response of a certain type of
rm that tends to be both highly connected to leading gures and more likely to benet from
certain kinds of (potentially) sound macroeconomic policies that Timothy Geithner may have
been expected to pursue. Our results also suggest that the timing of Geithners appointment,
in the midst of the crisis, was crucial to our nding that connections matter as we do not
nd similar reactions to the announcement of Henry Paulson as Treasury Secretary.
5 Geithners Tax Problems
A secondary event related to Geithners nomination as Treasury Secretary allows us to further
test the relation between Geithner connections and rm value. On Tuesday, January 13, 2009,
the Senate Finance Committee publicly disclosed that Geithner had failed to pay over $34,000
in taxes while an employee of the International Monetary Fund. This disclosure cast doubt
on whether Geithner would be conrmed by the Senate. If the market expected Geithner-
connected rms to derive value from his position as Treasury Secretary, then this event should
have been associated with negative stock returns for Geithner-connected rms, at least to the
extent that the market believed that Geithners conrmation was truly in jeopardy.
To measure the impact of this news on Geithner-connected rms, we dene event day 0
as January 14, 2009, because the Senate Finance Committee announcement was made after
the market closed on January 13, 2009. As for the end of the event period, it is impossible to
determine exactly when it became clear to most market participants that Geithner would be
conrmed, despite the tax issue. We examined all articles concerning Geithner and his taxes
46The samples for stock prices and for CDS spreads are very di¤erent hence the di¤erence in results between
Columns 1 through 3 and 4 through 6, e.g., for Corzine connections.
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appearing in The Wall Street Journal, beginning on January 14. The rst article to predict
that Geithner would be conrmed appeared on Wednesday, January 21, or event day 4.47 (The
markets were closed on Monday, January 19.)
We rst perform univariate tests in which we compare actual returns between connected
and non-connected rms for event days 0 through 4. In these tests we alter the base sample
to also exclude the top 10% of rms based on return correlation with Bank of America, as the
Geithner tax event occurred shortly after a new Bank of America bailout was announced. We
nd that from event day 0 through event day 3, using the schedule measure of connections,
connected rms underperformed non-connected rms by 7.9 percentage points, a di¤erence that
is signicant at the 5% level. This result is consistent with a loss of value for Geithner-connected
rms due to his tax issues. Personal connections and New York connections demonstrate
this same underperformance, although the results are not statistically signicant using these
measures of connections. We also nd that the fortunes of connected rms reversed on event
day 4, when Geithners conrmation appeared to be solidied, as connected rms outperformed
non-connected rms on this day. The positive abnormal returns on event day 4 are statistically
signicant for two of the three mesaures of connections.
We perform similar univariate tests for actual returns for the full sample, as well as for
cumulative abnormal returns for both the base sample and the full sample. These sets of
results show a similar pattern of negative and signicant returns through day 3 that tend
to reverse on day 4, although there are exceptions to this pattern. Generally speaking, the
pattern is stronger and more statistically signicant when using the full sample rather than
the base sample, and the pattern is weaker when using cumulative abnormal returns rather
than actual returns. Appendix Table A9 presents all of these results in detail. Overall, the
pattern of returns in the univariate results is consistent with the hypothesis that Geithners
tax problems created a negative shock to Geithner connections, and that concern over the news
dissipated after a few days, particularly on event day 4.
We also estimate the e¤ect of Geithner connections during his tax problems in a regression
framework. We estimate equation (1) for the tax event, including all standard control variables
as in our previous regressions. The OLS results show that Geithner connections tend to be
associated with negative returns when Geithners tax problems were disclosed, though these
estimates are less precise than our main results and often are not signicant. In some cases
47Deborah Solomon, The Inauguration: Tax Issue Wont Derail Geithner,The Wall Street Journal, January
21, 2009.
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the coe¢ cient on Geithner connections is positive, particularly for New York connections. The
synthetic matching results are more consistent with the univariate results, as the coe¢ cient
on Geithner connections is almost always negative and often signicant. Appendix Table A10
presents these regression results in detail. Overall, although the regression results are fairly
imprecise, the univariate and regression results together are consistent with the hypothesis
that connections to Geithner were a source of value for connected rms, but the market may
have correctly anticipated that tax issues would not prevent Geithners conrmation.
6 After the Announcement
The results above imply that market participants expected a Geithner Treasury to benet
nancial institutions that had connections to the incoming Secretary. Even without specifying
a precise channel of inuence, the nding that people via the markets thought that connec-
tions to the incoming Treasury Secretary would pay o¤ in nancial terms is itself noteworthy.
There is a further question that still deserves consideration, however: whether the expec-
tations revealed by this event study were sensible. In particular, did the social connections
meets the crisisview make sense around the time of Timothy Geithners nomination as Trea-
sury Secretary? By its nature, this is not a question that can be answered conclusively, but at
least some pieces of evidence which we now discuss are consistent with this interpretation.
6.1 Hiring
Geithner hired a number of key people from prominent Wall Street rms, including from those
with which he had a strong connection. Mark Patterson, a former Goldman Sachs lobbyist,
became his chief of sta¤. Lee Sachs, previously with Bear Stearns and Mariner Investment
Group, became a senior adviser to Geithner with responsibility for helping to design nancial
sector policies. Herb Allison, who was brought in to run TARP as assistant secretary, was
formerly a senior executive at Merrill Lynch and TIAA-CREF. David Miller, a Goldman Sachs
alumnus, became TARPs chief investment o¢ cer; as a member of the Paulson Treasury, he
had been involved in the bailouts of late 2008 and early 2009.48
Not all of Geithners sta¤ came from Wall Street. For example, Neal Wolin, whose pri-
vate sector experience was at The Hartford, an insurance company, became Deputy Treasury
Secretary. However, Wolin had previously worked in the Rubin-Summers Treasury, so this is
48Michael J. De La Merced, Treasurys Warrior at the Negotiating Table,The New York Times, January
31, 2011.
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consistent with Geithner hiring people from within his personal network.
6.2 From Nomination to Conrmation
Geithners nomination was leaked to the press on November 21, 2008, but he was not con-
rmed by the Senate until January 26, 2009. In the interim, he undoubtedly had inuence on
policymaking within Treasury, both as president of the New York Fed and the likely incoming
Treasury Secretary. This period was marked by two high-prole interventions: the bailout of
Citigroup in late November and the bailout of Bank of America in January. These bailouts
represented major emergency subsidies from the Treasury Department. In each case, the bank
received additional TARP capital, but the government also agreed to guarantee a pool of assets
against declines in value. These guarantees were e¤ectively a non-transparent and underpriced
form of insurance (compared with what such guarantees would have cost in the free market).49
While the Citigroup bailout (November 2008 edition) was always understood as a means of
saving the bank, it was reported in January 2009 that the Bank of America bailout had been
promised in exchange for the bank agreeing to complete its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, then
the third-largest investment bank on Wall Street. In April 2009, an investigation by New York
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo further revealed that then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
had threatened to replace Ken Lewis as CEO of Bank of America if he refused to complete
the Merrill acquisition. These interventions clearly beneted Citigroup, which otherwise might
have failed, and Merrill Lynch, which otherwise would almost certainly have failed. Whether
they beneted Bank of America is another question that is di¢ cult to answer. As losses
mounted at Merrill in December 2008, it may have become rational for Bank of America to
walk away from the planned acquisition; the subsidy provided by the government in the form
of the January bailout may or may not have compensated it for those additional losses. The
net e¤ect was to press a North Carolina-based bank (with relatively small investment banking
operations) to complete its acquisition of a New York-based investment bank.
6.3 Rescue Programs Under Geithner
Geithners Capital Assistance Program (CAP) was one mechanism for providing capital to
banks that needed it. The terms of the CAP were generally favorable to the recipients of
capital, but it is not obvious whether the program was more or less favorable than the Capital
49According to the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, the Citigroup bailout contained an implicit subsidy
of 50%, as compared to a subsidy of 22% in the TARP Capital Purchase Program. Congressional Oversight
Panel, February Oversight Report: Valuing Treasurys Acquisitions,February 6, 2009.
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Purchase Program that was created by Paulson in October 2008. Investments under the CAP
were in convertible preferred stock, which has the potential to dilute existing bank shareholders.
However, the conversion option was held by the bank, not by Treasury.50
At the same time, the CAP was coupled with bank stress tests that were conducted in
March and April 2009 on 19 major nancial institutions. Of the 19 institutions, ten were
found to need additional capital. The complexity of bank balance sheets, and the process by
which the test results were released, left signicant room for rm-specic negotiation. At least
Citigroup, Bank of America, PNC Financial, and Wells Fargo negotiated with the government
over the nal stress test results. According to The Wall Street Journal, The Federal Reserve
signicantly scaled back the size of the capital hole facing some of the nations biggest banks
shortly before concluding its stress tests, following two weeks of intense bargaining.51 This
created latitude for regulators to take actions that might favor some banks over others.52
The Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) delivered on the expectation that Geithner
would revive Paulsons original plan to purchase banks troubled assets. The PPIP o¤ered
non-recourse government loans and FDIC loan guarantees to private sector investors willing to
acquire troubled assets. This plan e¤ectively provided a subsidy to these investors in order to
increase their willingness to pay for the assets and help close the gap that separated bids and
asks in the open market. Therefore, the plan aimed to benet banks holding large amounts of
troubled assets, but it also beneted buy-side institutions such as hedge funds, private equity
rms, and asset management rms that could participate in the program. According to Neil
Barofsky, then Special Inspector General for TARP, PPIP had been designed by Wall Street,
for Wall Streetin particular, by BlackRock, the Trust Company of the West Group, and
PIMCO, suggesting that there was some potential for well-connected nancial institutions to
inuence government policy at key moments during the nancial crisis.53
Following Geithners conrmation, Treasury engaged in fewer rm-specic interventions
than in the November 2008January 2009 period. The two big exceptions were the Citigroup
bailout on February 27, 2009, and the AIG bailout on March 2, 2009.
50Capital Assistance Program, Summary of Mandatorily Convertible Preferred Stock (Convertible Pre-
ferred) Terms, Treasury Department fact sheet, February 25, 2009, available at www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/tg40_captermsheet.pdf.
51David Enrich, Dan Fitzpatrick, and Marshall Eckblad, Banks Won Concessions on Tests,The Wall Street
Journal, May 9, 2009.
52For example, the decision to base capital requirements on Tier 1 common capital rather than tangible
common equity a¤ected di¤erent banks di¤erently, arguably hurting Wells Fargo the most. Ibid.; Felix Salmon,
Chart of the Day: Common Capital vs. TCE,Reuters, May 9, 2009.
53Barofsky (2012), p. 129. Bloomberg reports that BlackRock did very well on its TTIP-related investments,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-05/blackrock-liquidates-ppip-fund-earning-u-s-treasury-24-.html.
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In late February 2009, there were signs that Citigroup was facing another wholesale bank
run, most evident in its declining stock price, the falling price of its subordinated bonds, and the
rising price of credit default swap protection on its senior bonds. Geithners initial proposal was
to split Citigroup into a good bankand a bad bank. According to Sheila Bair, this would
have transferred all of the banks losses to the FDIC, without imposing any loss absorption on
shareholders and bondholders,and letting Citis private stakeholders take all of the upside
(Bair (2012), p. 167). The governments eventual response was to engineer a preferred-for-
common swap including both the Treasury Department and several large investors in Citigroup;
however, many of the preferred shareholders and subordinated debt investors were not required
to convert their investments into common stock.54 The banks common stock price fell on the
news, so presumably the market was expecting an even more generous bailout.55
After a disastrous fourth quarter of 2008 that threatened AIGs viability as a going concern,
the government improved the terms on its existing preferred stock and AIGs credit line, and
invested more cash in exchange for more preferred stock.56 By this point, AIG was largely
owned by the U.S. government, so the bailout was not intended to benet AIGs shareholders;
instead, its goal was to keep AIG aoat in order to minimize collateral damage to other rms.
Because it was still considered solvent, AIG was able to honor its commitments to its counter-
parties, largely credit default swap protection it had sold to other nancial institutions such as
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wachovia, Morgan Stanley, and
JPMorgan Chase. As a result of AIG being able to make its counterparties whole, these banks
received more cash than they would have if AIG had failed.57
7 Conclusion
The announcement of Timothy Geithner as President-elect Obamas nominee for Treasury
Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for nancial rms with
54Transaction Outline, Treasury Department fact sheet, February 27, 2009, available at
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/transaction_outline.pdf.
55Citigroup (along with GM and AIG) also beneted from Notices issued by the Treasury Department
allowing the company to keep the tax benets provided by its past net operating losses a policy that has been
contested by a number of commentators and legal scholars. See, for example, Ramseyer and Rasmussen (2011).
56U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce Participation in AIG Re-
structuring Plan, Treasury Department press release, March 2, 2009, available at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20090302a.htm
57Goldman Sachs claimed that even if AIG had collapsed, its positions with AIG were fully hedged. Peter
Edmonston, Goldman Insists It Would Have Lost Little If A.I.G. Had Failed,The New York Times, March
20, 2009. Barofsky argues that AIG did not need to pay 100 cents on the dollar, but there was no serious
attempt to negotiate a reduction in payments (Barofsky (2012), pp. 186-187).
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which he had a connection relative to other comparable, non-connected rms. According to
our estimates, this excess return was about 6% at the close of the rst full day of trading after
the announcement and about 12% after ten trading days. Our ndings are fairly robust and
similar using di¤erent measures of connections, with exible controls for rm size and other
characteristics, and also with a synthetic matching methodology. There were subsequently
abnormal negative returns for connected rms when news broke that Geithners conrmation
might be derailed by tax issues, although these returns are less precisely estimated.
It is implausible to interpret these results as evidence of Geithner being corrupted or seek-
ing material gain. Instead, in our view, the excess returns for being connected to Geithner
reect the markets expectation that, during a period of turbulence and unusually high policy
discretion, the new Treasury Secretary would need to rely on a core group of employees and
a small social network for real-time advice and that these employees were likely to be hired
from nancial institutions with which Geithner had connections. This motivates the social
connections meets the crisisinterpretation.
We lean towards this interpretation because our results cannot be explained by the idea
that Geithner just brought a safe pair of hands to the management of the economy, or by the
notion that Geithner and his advisors solely favored large, complex Wall Street rms at the
expense of other nancial institutions. Our results control exibly for rm size, protability,
and leverage, and are based, therefore, on di¤erences between connected and non-connected
nancial institutions of roughly the same size. Consistent with this interpretation, Geithners
Treasury initially hired key personnel from nancial institutions with which he was connected,
and some of the decisions of his department can be interpreted as being, at the margin, favorable
to connected rms (in particular for Citigroup, on which we have the most detailed anecdotal
evidence).
If our interpretation is correct, benets to connected rms are temporary and very much
related to the crisis atmosphere of November 2008. Once policy discretion declines and the
speed with which important decisions have to be taken slows down, these connections should
become less important. This is consistent with Querubín and Snyders (2013) ndings from
the Civil War era, where the excess wealth gains of congressmen disappear after the end of the
large government expenditures and discretion. Whether this is in fact the case in the modern
U.S. context remains an area for further research.
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Fig. 1. Time-series plots of the synthetic matching estimate of the coefficient on Geithner 
connections for cumulative abnormal returns measured over the interval [x, x+1]  for each 
trading day x in November 2008.  Connected firms are represented in Panel A and highly 
connected firms in Panel B. Confidence intervals at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are also shown. 
Citigroup-correlated firms are excluded. November 21, 2008 is the day of the Geithner 
nomination announcement.  



















































 Mean Min 25th Pctile  Median 75th Pctile Max  St. Dev.  N
(1) Geithner Connections (Schedule) 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.00 1.74 603
(2) Geithner Connections (Personal) 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.00 0.60 603
(3) Geithner Connection (New York) 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.26 603
(4) Size 21.33 16.32 20.23 21.03 22.10 28.41 1.72 596
(5) Profitability -0.05 -3.62 -0.06 0.04 0.09 0.82 0.35 585
(6) Leverage 0.57 0.00 0.43 0.61 0.71 3.10 0.27 592
(7) CAR[0] -0.02 -0.24 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.35 0.06 603
(8) CAR[0,1] -0.02 -0.46 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.48 0.11 603
(9) CAR[0,10] 0.02 -0.69 -0.10 -0.02 0.09 1.38 0.21 603
(10) CDS Spread, Day 1 4.65 0.23 1.16 2.33 5.32 29.29 6.15 30
(11) % Change in CDS Spread[1] -0.04 -0.49 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 30
(12) % Change in CDS Spread[1,10] -0.06 -0.49 -0.12 -0.03 0.00 0.15 0.13 30
Schedule Non Diff. Personal Non Diff. New York Non Diff.
(13) Size 24.40 21.20 3.20*** 25.00 21.20 3.80*** 21.78 21.30 0.48*
(14) Profitability 0.04 -0.06 0.10 -0.15 -0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.04 -0.13**
(15) Leverage 0.73 0.56 0.17*** 0.60 0.56 0.04 0.57 0.56 0.00
(16) Number of observations in full sample 25 578 21 582 45 558
Schedule Non Diff. Personal Non Diff. New York Non Diff.
(17) Size 23.13 20.98 2.16*** 23.17 21.00 2.17*** 20.95 21.04 -0.09
(18) Profitability 0.06 -0.07 0.13 -0.42 -0.06 -0.36*** -0.20 -0.05 -0.14**
(19) Leverage 0.71 0.56 0.15** 0.52 0.57 -0.05 0.54 0.57 -0.03
(20) Number of observations in base sample 15 530 9 536 38 507
Schedule Personal New York Size Profitability Leverage
(21) Geithner Connections (Schedule) 1.00
(22) Geithner Connections (Personal) 0.86 1.00
(23) Geithner Connection (New York) 0.35 0.39 1.00
(24) Size 0.35 0.37 0.10 1.00
(25) Profitability 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 0.05 1.00
(26) Leverage 0.04 0.06 -0.15 0.28 -0.16 1.00
Panel D:  Correlation Coefficients (Full sample)
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
The table presents descriptive statistics of firm-level data used in subsequent tables. The sample includes firms listed on NYSE or NASDAQ and classified
as banks or financial services firms in the Datastream database. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Schedule
connections denote the number of meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08; personal connections denote the number of shared
board memberships between the firm's executives and Geithner; New York connections indicate firms headquartered in New York City. Size (log of total
assets), profitability (return on equity), and leverage (total debt to total capital) are from the Worldscope database as of 2008. CDS spreads are from the
Markit database and are for five-year contracts, stated in percents.  Asterisks denote significance levels of a two-tailed t-test (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Panel A:  Summary Statistics (Full sample)
Panel B:  Geithner Connected vs. Non-connected (Full sample)
Panel C:  Geithner Connected vs. Non-connected (Base sample)
Panel A:  Actual returns, Base sample
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
0 11/21/2008 0.086 0.042 0.043 ** 0.075 0.043 0.033 0.085 0.040 0.044 ***
1 11/24/2008 0.130 0.046 0.084 *** 0.143 0.047 0.096 *** 0.078 0.046 0.031 *
2 11/25/2008 0.026 0.015 0.011 0.057 0.014 0.043 0.032 0.014 0.018
3 11/26/2008 0.112 0.041 0.071 *** 0.112 0.042 0.071 ** 0.087 0.040 0.048 ***
4 11/28/2008 0.056 0.018 0.038 * 0.085 0.018 0.067 ** 0.016 0.019 -0.003
5 12/1/2008 -0.131 -0.076 -0.056 ** -0.144 -0.076 -0.067 ** -0.105 -0.075 -0.030 *
6 12/2/2008 0.046 0.043 0.003 0.044 0.043 0.001 0.090 0.040 0.050 ***
7 12/3/2008 0.034 0.018 0.016 0.043 0.018 0.024 0.031 0.018 0.013
8 12/4/2008 -0.009 -0.013 0.005 0.005 -0.014 0.019 -0.020 -0.013 -0.008
9 12/5/2008 0.063 0.024 0.038 ** 0.042 0.025 0.017 0.050 0.024 0.026 **
10 12/8/2008 0.064 0.027 0.037 0.072 0.028 0.045 ** 0.050 0.027 0.023
0-10 (Cumulative) 0.551 0.180 0.371 *** 0.645 0.183 0.463 *** 0.468 0.169 0.299 ***
Panel B:  Cumulative abnormal returns, Base sample
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
0 11/21/2008 -0.013 -0.015 0.001 -0.034 -0.014 -0.020 -0.005 -0.015 0.010
1 11/24/2008 0.024 -0.022 0.046 0.005 -0.021 0.026 -0.011 -0.021 0.010
2 11/25/2008 0.039 -0.013 0.052 0.052 -0.012 0.064 0.012 -0.013 0.025
3 11/26/2008 0.099 -0.001 0.101 ** 0.107 0.000 0.108 * 0.053 -0.002 0.055 *
4 11/28/2008 0.141 0.009 0.132 *** 0.177 0.009 0.167 *** 0.056 0.009 0.048
5 12/1/2008 0.136 0.006 0.129 *** 0.175 0.007 0.168 *** 0.067 0.006 0.061 **
6 12/2/2008 0.124 0.017 0.107 ** 0.156 0.017 0.138 ** 0.105 0.013 0.092 ***
7 12/3/2008 0.120 0.013 0.107 ** 0.156 0.014 0.142 ** 0.101 0.010 0.091 ***
8 12/4/2008 0.152 0.024 0.129 ** 0.208 0.024 0.184 *** 0.118 0.021 0.098 ***
9 12/5/2008 0.162 0.018 0.144 *** 0.192 0.019 0.172 *** 0.121 0.015 0.106 ***
10 12/8/2008 0.171 0.014 0.157 *** 0.173 0.015 0.158 ** 0.120 0.010 0.110 ***
Table 2
Connections to Geithner and Stock Price Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement
The table presents stock returns of financial firms around the announcement of Barack Obama's nomination of Timothy Geithner as Treasury Secretary.
Event day 0 is November 21, 2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; the announcement was made on event day 1. Abnormal returns are
calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with
returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Schedule connections indicate meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08; personal
connections indicate shared board memberships between the firm's executives and Geithner; New York connections indicate firms headquartered in New
York City.  Asterisks denote significance levels of a two-tailed t-test (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Difference Difference Difference
Difference Difference Difference
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Geithner Connections 0.0033 *** 0.0073 ** 0.0132 * 0.011 *** 0.050 *** 0.005 0.009 0.070 *** 0.108 ***
(0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0072) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.023) (0.023)
Size -0.146 -0.109 -0.004 0.789 0.882 0.963 2.640 2.663 2.387
(0.204) (0.208) (0.203) (0.668) (0.685) (0.687) (1.636) (1.664) (1.657)
Size2 0.007 0.005 0.000 -0.039 -0.044 -0.048 -0.129 -0.131 -0.117
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079)
Size3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profitability 0.039 *** 0.039 *** 0.038 *** 0.029 0.033 0.029 -0.156 ** -0.150 ** -0.164 **
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
Profitability2 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.175 * -0.178 * -0.205 **
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090)
Profitability3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.034 -0.035 -0.040 *
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Leverage -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.075 -0.063 -0.096 0.567 *** 0.599 *** 0.670 ***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.079) (0.079) (0.082) (0.146) (0.147) (0.153)
Leverage2 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.091 0.078 0.128 -1.872 *** -1.916 *** -0.203 ***
(0.181) (0.181) (0.182) (0.226) (0.226) (0.229) (0.463) (0.464) (0.476)
Leverage3 -0.095 -0.096 -0.096 -0.008 -0.007 -0.033 1.449 *** 1.467 *** 1.539 ***
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.177) (0.177) (0.179) (0.388) (0.387) (0.395)
Number of firms 583 583 583 525 525 525 525 525 525
R-squared 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.043 0.049 0.038 0.065 0.070 0.078
Schedule Personal New York
(9)(8)
Dependent variable is CAR [0,10]
(Base sample)
Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal
Dependent variable is CAR [0]
(Full sample)




The table reports coefficient estimates of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner as Treasury Secretary on
measures of connections to Geithner. Event day 0 is November 21, 2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; the announcement was made on event day 1.
The CAR is measured as day 0 only, from day 0 to day 1, or from day 0 to day 10, as indicated. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation
window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Schedule connections denote
the number of meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08; personal connections denote the number of shared board memberships between the firm's
executives and Geithner; New York connections indicate firms headquartered in New York City. Control variables include cubics in size (log of total assets), profitability
(return on equity), and leverage (total debt to total capital) as of 2008. Robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms, are below coefficients in
parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(2) (4) (6)
Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, OLS Regression Results
(7)(1) (3) (5)
Geithner Connections 0.0034 *** 0.0079 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0075 ** 0.0046 *** 0.0144 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0108 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0058 * 0.0037 * 0.0052 0.0032 *** 0.0070 ** 0.0043 ***
(0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0010) (0.0037) (0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0065) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0013)
Number of firms 576 576 579 579 583 583 196 196 58 58 566 566 571 571 583
R-squared 0.040 0.037 0.049 0.047 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.358 0.303 0.036 0.035 0.043 0.039 0.037
Geithner Connections 0.011 *** 0.051 *** 0.011 *** 0.048 *** 0.015 *** 0.065 *** 0.014 *** 0.051 *** -0.002 0.039 *** 0.012 *** 0.051 *** 0.009 *** 0.048 *** 0.030 ***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005)
Number of firms 518 518 521 521 525 525 196 196 52 52 523 523 517 517 525
R-squared 0.042 0.050 0.039 0.045 0.057 0.065 0.232 0.217 0.217 0.250 0.040 0.048 0.056 0.065 0.048
Geithner Connections 0.004 0.045 ** 0.008 0.064 *** 0.023 *** 0.120 *** 0.020 *** 0.076 *** 0.002 0.140 *** 0.018 ** 0.065 *** 0.010 0.072 *** -0.003
(0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.023) (0.004) (0.014) (0.008) (0.032) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.023) (0.010)
Number of firms 518 518 521 521 525 525 196 196 52 52 523 523 516 516 525













Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, OLS Robustness Checks
The table reports coefficient estimates of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner as Treasury Secretary on measures of connections to Geithner. Event day 0 is November
21, 2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; the announcement was made on event day 1. The CAR is measured as day 0 only, from day 0 to day 1, or from day 0 to day 10, as indicated. Abnormal returns are
calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Schedule connections denote the
number of meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08 (only 2007 in Column 15); personal connections denote the number of shared board memberships between the firm's executives and Geithner. Control
variables (not reported) include cubics in size (log of total assets), profitability (return on equity), and leverage (total debt to total capital) as of 2008. In Columns 1 and 2, other controls (not reported) include the CAR[0,4] for the firm
upon the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm takes deposits, and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm had accepted TARP funding prior to the announcement. In Columns 3 and 4, a control for
the CAR[0,1] surrounding the announcement that TARP would be used for capital injections is included. In Columns 5 and 6, the estimation window is a five-week window surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In Columns
7 and 8, toxic asset exposure is a measure of mortgage/asset-backed security holdings scaled by total assets, and the full sample is used in all panels. In Columns 11 and 12, "systemic importance" firms are those that were later
evaluated in government-administered stress tests.  Robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms, are below coefficients in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (5) (6) (8) (14)(3)
Personal
Control for crisis 
vulnerability
Lehman collapse 
estimation beta Top size decile only
Control for response to 
TARP capital injections
Schedule Personal
Control for toxic asset 
exposure
Panel B: Dependent variable is CAR [0,1] (Base sample)
Panel C: Dependent variable is CAR [0,10] (Base sample)
Personal Schedule
Panel A: Dependent variable is CAR [0] (Full sample)
Schedule Personal Schedule Personal Schedule
Geithner Connections (Schedule) 0.014 0.005 0.005 0.029 * 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.000 0.000
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.029 -0.027 -0.043 -0.039 -0.037 -0.034
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.014 0.012 0.029 0.026 0.021 0.019
     Number of sig. coefficients (10%) 29 8 14 27 13 16 25 0 6
     Number of sig. coefficients (5%) 19 4 8 25 6 9 17 0 0
     Number of sig. coefficients (1%) 11 0 0 17 1 1 5 0 0
Number of firms 583 583 466 570 570 462 574 574 453
Number in treatment group 22 22 22 9 9 9 13 13 13
Geithner Connections (Schedule) 0.059 *** 0.060 *** 0.060 *** 0.149 *** 0.153 *** 0.153 *** 0.028 * 0.034 * 0.034 *
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.068 -0.066 -0.126 -0.113 -0.077 -0.074
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.036 0.029 0.099 0.091 0.042 0.038
     Number of sig. coefficients (10%) 23 13 17 23 3 5 22 5 11
     Number of sig. coefficients (5%) 17 5 9 11 0 2 18 2 4
     Number of sig. coefficients (1%) 9 0 2 6 0 0 9 0 1
Number of firms 525 525 439 516 516 436 522 522 429
Number in treatment group 12 12 12 3 3 3 9 9 9
Geithner Connections (Schedule) 0.111 *** 0.124 *** 0.124 *** 0.069 0.169 * 0.169 * 0.101 *** 0.110 ** 0.110 **
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.110 -0.099 -0.197 -0.191 -0.119 -0.112
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.079 0.071 0.217 0.194 0.093 0.085
     Number of sig. coefficients (10%) 41 18 28 26 16 19 51 13 18
     Number of sig. coefficients (5%) 32 8 11 17 8 10 43 3 7
     Number of sig. coefficients (1%) 21 0 3 4 1 1 26 0 1
Number of firms 525 525 439 516 516 436 522 522 429
Number in treatment group 12 12 12 3 3 3 9 9 9
Table 5
Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, Synthetic Matching Estimation
The table reports synthetic matching estimates of the effect of connections to Geithner on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner as
Treasury Secretary. Event day 0 is November 21, 2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; the announcement was made on event day 1. The CAR is measured as
day 0 only, from day 0 to day 1, or from day 0 to day 10, as indicated. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days
ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Schedule connections indicate meetings between the firm's
executives and Geithner during 2007-08; "Highly connected" indicates more than two meetings; "Mildly connected" indicates one or two meetings. The matching window is the
250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. Confidence intervals for hypothesis testing of the effect of Geithner connections being equal to zero are computed according
to 5,000 placebo simulations. The number of times in which the Geithner coefficient is significant for a test window of 100 trading days is also reported. OLS results (on a dummy
for connections) are reported for comparison, and include control variables (not reported) for cubics in size (log of total assets), profitability (return on equity), and leverage (total
debt to total capital) as of 2008.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All Geithner connections Highly connected Mildly connected
OLS Matching Corrected OLS Matching
Panel B: Dependent variable is CAR [0,1] (Base sample)
Panel C: Dependent variable is CAR [0,10] (Base sample)
Corrected OLS Matching Corrected
Panel A: Dependent variable is CAR [0] (Full sample)
Geithner Connections 0.060 * 0.071 * 0.071 * 0.179 *** 0.192 ** 0.192 ** 0.018 0.043 0.043
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.064 -0.062 -0.126 -0.123 -0.073 -0.070
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.056 0.055 0.131 0.131 0.065 0.065
Number of firms 525 525 473 516 516 476 522 522 463
Number in treatment group 12 12 12 3 3 3 9 9 9
Geithner Connections 0.059 *** 0.032 0.032 0.091 *** 0.104 ** 0.104 ** 0.037 -0.010 -0.010
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.080 -0.078 -0.126 -0.125 -0.100 -0.099
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.041 0.044 0.096 0.099 0.069 0.066
Number of firms 525 525 501 520 520 505 522 522 491
Number in treatment group 8 8 8 3 3 3 5 5 5
Geithner Connections 0.005 0.009 * 0.014 **
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.049 -0.048
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.010 0.008
Number of firms 525 525 507
Number in treatment group 34 34 33
Geithner Connections 0.083 *** 0.053 * 0.053 ** 0.144 *** 0.122 ** 0.122 ** 0.027 -0.012 -0.012
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.090 -0.081 -0.127 -0.110 -0.123 -0.113
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.056 0.049 0.099 0.078 0.096 0.072
Number of firms 525 525 382 522 522 387 522 522 374
Number in treatment group 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 3
(8) (9)
All Geithner connections Highly connected Mildly connected
Table 6
Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, Synthetic Matching Robustness Checks
The table reports synthetic matching estimates of the effect of connections to Geithner on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner as
Treasury Secretary. Event day 0 is November 21, 2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; the announcement was made on event day 1. The CAR is measured
from day 0 to day 1. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0 (a five-week
window surrounding the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Panel A). The base sample (used throughout the table) excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup. Schedule
connections denote the number of meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08 (only 2007 in Panel D); personal connections denote the number of shared
board memberships between the firm's executives and Geithner; New York connections indicate firms headquartered in New York City. "Highly connected" indicates more than one
connection (more than two in Panel A); "Mildly connected" indicates one connection (one or two in Panel A). The matching window is the 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to
event day 0. Confidence intervals for hypothesis testing of the effect of Geithner connections being equal to zero are computed according to 5,000 placebo simulations. OLS results
(on a dummy for connections) are reported for comparison, and include control variables (not reported) for cubics in size (log of total assets), profitability (return on equity), and
leverage (total debt to total capital) as of 2008.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS Matching CorrectedOLS Matching Corrected OLS Matching Corrected
Panel D: 2007 Schedule
Panel C: New York connections
Dependent variable is CAR [0,1]
Panel A: Financial crisis estimation window, Schedule connections
Panel B: Personal connections
Panel A: Dependent variable is CAR[-1,0]
Geithner Connections -0.013 -0.040 -0.005 -0.016 -0.017
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.049 -0.119 -0.060 -0.061 -0.026
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.044 0.092 0.052 0.056 0.027
Number of firms 525 516 522 525 525
Number in treatment group 12 3 9 8 34
Panel B: Dependent variable is CAR[-5,0]
Geithner Connections -0.053 -0.047 -0.055 -0.040 -0.0143
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.060 -0.159 -0.074 -0.082 -0.0272
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.072 0.142 0.086 0.088 0.04866
Number of firms 525 516 522 525 525
Number in treatment group 12 3 9 8 34
Panel C: Dependent variable is CAR[-10,0]
Geithner Connections -0.064 -0.021 -0.077 -0.090 -0.040 *
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.087 -0.216 -0.102 -0.119 -0.041
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.087 0.166 0.099 0.107 0.055
Number of firms 525 516 522 525 525
Number in treatment group 12 3 9 8 34
Table 7
Connections to Geithner and Returns Prior to Treasury Secretary Announcement
The table reports synthetic matching estimates of the effect of connections to Geithner on cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner as Treasury Secretary. Event day 0 is November 21,
2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; the announcement was made on event day 1. The
CAR is measured from event day -1 to event day 0, day -5 to day 0, or day -10 to day 0 as indicated. Abnormal
returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days
prior to event day 0. The base sample (used throughout the table) excludes firms with returns highly correlated
to Citigroup. Schedule connections denote the number of meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner
during 2007-08; personal connections denote the number of shared board memberships between the firm's
executives and Geithner; New York connections indicate firms headquartered in New York City. "Highly
connected" indicates more than two meetings, "Mildly connected" indicates one or two meetings. Confidence
intervals for hypothesis testing of the effect of Geithner connections being equal to zero are computed according
to 5,000 placebo simulations.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Schedule Personal New York
All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn. All Conn.
Panel A: OLS estimates
Geithner Connections -0.014 *** -0.035 *** -0.113 ** -0.010 ** -0.019 ** -0.072 -0.011 -0.030 -0.202 -0.010 -0.019 -0.176
(0.002) (0.007) (0.044) (0.005) (0.010) (0.049) (0.007) (0.028) (0.150) (0.022) (0.038) (0.164)
Number of firms 27 27 27 26 26 26 27 27 27 26 26 26
R-squared 0.941 0.795 0.615 0.772 0.834 0.748 0.671 0.639 0.726 0.479 0.493 0.674
Panel B: Synthetic matching estimates
Geithner Connections -0.087 *** -0.047 *** -0.119 *** -0.026 *** -0.024 *** -0.044 *** -0.042 -0.092 *** -0.203 *** 0.018 -0.071 *** -0.150 ***
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.006 -0.067 -0.019 -0.068 -0.072 -0.034 -0.072
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.040 0.000 0.055 0.054 0.006 0.072
Number of firms 27 27 27 26 26 26 27 27 27 26 26 26
Number in treatment group 7 11 6 6 10 5 7 11 6 6 10 5
Dependent variable is % change in CDS spread [1] Dependent variable is % change in CDS spread [1,10]
Citigroup included Citigroup excluded
Schedule Personal New York Schedule
Citigroup included Citigroup excluded
Personal New YorkSchedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The table reports estimates of the effect of connections to Geithner on CDS spreads surrounding the announcement of Geithner as Treasury Secretary. Panel A reports OLS estimates and Panel B reports synthetic
matching estimates. Event day 0 is November 21, 2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; due to a lack of liquidity and intraday quotes, the changes are measured from day 1, when the announcement
was made. The % change in CDS spread is measured as day 1 only, or from day 1 to day 10, as indicated. Schedule connections denote the number of meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-
08; personal connections denote the number of shared board memberships between the firm's executives and Geithner; New York connections indicate firms headquartered in New York City. In Panel A, control
variables (not reported) include cubics in size (log of total assets), profitability (return on equity), and leverage (total debt to total capital) as of 2008; robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between
firms, are below coefficients in parentheses. In Panel B, the matching window is the 100 days ending 30 days prior to event day 0; confidence intervals for hypothesis testing of the effect of Geithner connections being
equal to zero are computed according to 5,000 placebo simulations.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(5) (6)
Dependent variable is % change in CDS spread [1] Dependent variable is % change in CDS spread [1,10]
Table 8
Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, CDS Spreads
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Citigroup included Citigroup excluded Citigroup included Citigroup excluded
Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York Schedule Personal New York
Geithner Connections 0.020 *** 0.023 ** 0.017 * -0.035 *** -0.063 *** -0.070 ***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014)
Summers Connections 0.011 -0.024
(0.016) (0.034)
Corzine Connections 0.020 0.089 **
(0.015) (0.033)




Other Candidates Combined 0.002 0.028 ***
(0.007) (0.010)
Number of firms 582 582 582 27 27 27
R-squared 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.795 0.941 0.880
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable is % change in CDS spread [1]Dependent variable is CAR [0,1]
Table 9
Connections to Other Treasury Secretary Candidates and Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement
The table reports coefficient estimates of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) and percent changes in CDS spreads
surrounding the announcement of Geithner as Treasury Secretary on measures of connections to Treasury Secretary candidates. Event day 0
is November 21, 2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; the announcement was made on event day 1. In Columns 1 to 3,
the CAR is measured from day 0 to day 1, and in Columns 4 to 6, the percent change in CDS spreads is measured for day 1. Abnormal stock
returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. Estimates
for the full sample (excluding Citigroup in CAR results) are reported. Connections denote the number of shared board memberships between
the firm's executives and the candidate. Control variables (not reported) include cubics in size (log of total assets), profitability (return on
equity), and leverage (total debt to total capital) as of 2008. Robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms, are
below coefficients in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2)
ONLINE APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Firm Occurrences
Base
Sample CAR [0,10] Total Assets ($Bn) Firm CAR [0,10] Total Assets ($Bn)
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 14 N 0.186 2,175.00 WELLS FARGO & CO 0.124 1,310.00
CITIGROUP INCO. 34 N 0.743 1,938.00 FREDDIE MAC 0.659 835.60
BANK OF AMERICA CORP. 4 N 0.168 1,818.00 US BANCORP 0.078 265.90
FANNIE MAE 1 N 1.008 908.50 SUNTRUST BANKS INCO. 0.200 189.10
THE GOLDMAN SACHS GPIN. 10 N 0.192 876.20 SLM CORP. 0.064 168.80
MORGAN STANLEY 9 N 0.224 658.80 CAPITAL ONE FINL.CORP. -0.053 165.90
PNC FINL.SVS.GP.INCO. 3 N 0.044 291.10 BB&T CORP. -0.131 152.00
BANK OF NY.MELLON CORP. 7 Y -0.095 237.50 REGIONS FINL.CORP. -0.206 146.20
STATE STREET CORP. 1 Y 0.091 173.60 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP -0.232 119.50
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. 2 N 0.029 122.60 KEYCORP 0.062 104.50
NORTHERN TRUST CORP. 1 Y 0.117 82.05 AMERIPRISE FINL.INCO. 0.297 94.67
CME GROUP INCO. 2 Y 0.010 48.16 CIT GROUP INCO. 0.500 80.45
NY.CMTY.BANC.INCO. 2 N -0.078 32.33 COMERICA INCO. 0.037 67.55
ASTORIA FINL.CORP. 2 N -0.132 21.98 M&T BK.CORP. -0.045 65.82
BLACKROCK INCO. 13 Y 0.082 19.91 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP. -0.300 62.34
NYSE EURONEXT 2 N 0.089 13.28 ZIONS BANCORPORATION -0.255 54.61
THE NASDAQ OMX GP.INCO. 2 Y 0.212 12.05 HUNTINGTON BCSH.INCO. -0.073 54.35
THE BLACKSTONE GROUP LP. 6 Y 0.345 8.41 HUDSON CITY BANC.INCO. -0.231 54.09
PROVIDENT FINL.SVS.INCO. 2 Y -0.145 6.51 CHARLES SCHWAB CORP. -0.141 51.17
LAZARD LTD. 1 Y 0.126 2.79 MF GLOBAL LTD. -0.180 49.18
MOODY'S CORP. 2 N 0.114 1.55 E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP. 0.051 47.50
OCH-ZIFF CAP.MAN.GP.LLC. 1 N 0.107 1.02 DISCOVER FINANCIAL SVS. 0.122 39.20
BEACON FED.BANC.INCORP. 1 Y 0.039 1.02 POPULAR INCO. -0.194 38.53
FEDERATED INVRS.INCO. 1 Y 0.065 0.85 SYNOVUS FINL.CORP. -0.031 35.62
EVERCORE PARTNERS INCO. 1 Y 0.485 0.68 FIRST HORIZON NAT. CORP. -0.124 31.02
Firm Connections
Base
Sample CAR [0,10] Total Assets ($Bn) Firm CAR [0,10] Total Assets ($Bn)
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 5 N 0.186 2,175.00 FREDDIE MAC 0.659 835.60
CITIGROUP INCO. 9 N 0.743 1,938.00 US BANCORP 0.078 265.90
BANK OF AMERICA CORP. 1 N 0.168 1,818.00 BANK OF NY.MELLON CORP. -0.095 237.50
WELLS FARGO & CO 1 N 0.124 1,310.00 SUNTRUST BANKS INCO. 0.200 189.10
FANNIE MAE 1 N 1.008 908.50 STATE STREET CORP. 0.091 173.60
THE GOLDMAN SACHS GPIN. 8 N 0.192 876.20 SLM CORP. 0.064 168.80
MORGAN STANLEY 3 N 0.224 658.80 BB&T CORP. -0.131 152.00
PNC FINL.SVS.GP.INCO. 1 N 0.044 291.10 REGIONS FINL.CORP. -0.206 146.20
CAPITAL ONE FINL.CORP. 1 N -0.053 165.90 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP -0.232 119.50
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. 1 N 0.029 122.60 KEYCORP 0.062 104.50
CIT GROUP INCO. 2 Y 0.500 80.45 AMERIPRISE FINL.INCO. 0.297 94.67
M&T BK.CORP. 1 N -0.045 65.82 NORTHERN TRUST CORP. 0.117 82.05
POPULAR INCO. 1 Y -0.194 38.53 COMERICA INCO. 0.037 67.55
BLACKROCK INCO. 2 Y 0.082 19.91 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP. -0.300 62.34
NYSE EURONEXT 1 N 0.089 13.28 ZIONS BANCORPORATION -0.255 54.61
THE NASDAQ OMX GP.INCO. 1 Y 0.212 12.05 HUNTINGTON BCSH.INCO. -0.073 54.35
FRANKLIN RESOURCES INCO. 1 N 0.046 9.18 HUDSON CITY BANC.INCO. -0.231 54.09
THE BLACKSTONE GROUP LP. 4 Y 0.345 8.41 CHARLES SCHWAB CORP. -0.141 51.17
FORTRESS INV.GP.LLC. 1 Y -0.131 1.17 MF GLOBAL LTD. -0.180 49.18
CARVER BANCORP INCO. 1 Y -0.116 0.79 CME GROUP INCO. 0.010 48.16
GAMCO INVESTORS INCO. 1 Y -0.147 0.67 E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP. 0.051 47.50
Panel B:  Personal Connections
Personal Connection to Geithner No Personal Connection (21 Largest)
Appendix Table A1
Comparison of Geithner-Connected Firms to Non-Connected Firms
The table compares firms with identifiable connections to Geithner to those with no connections. Schedule connections (Panel A) denote the number of
meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08; personal connections (Panel B) denote the number of shared board memberships
between the firm's executives and Geithner. "Base Sample" indicates whether the firm is included in the base sample (by virtue of not being highly
correlated to Citigroup). CAR [0,10] is the cumulative abnormal return for the firm surrounding the announcement of Geithner as Treasury Secretary.
Total assets are for the year 2008 from Worldscope.
Panel A:  Schedule Connections
On Geithner's Schedule Not on Geithner's Schedule (25 Largest)





American Express Kenneth I. Chenault chairman & CEO National Academy Foundation director director
American Express Kenneth I. Chenault chairman & CEO Partnership for New York City board member vice chair
Bank of America Patricia E. Mitchell director Council on Foreign Relations member member
BlackRock James E. Rohr director RAND Corporation trustee trustee
BlackRock John A. Thain director Unofficial Adviser to Geithner NA NA
Blackstone Group J. Tomilson Hill vice chairman Council on Foreign Relations member director
Blackstone Group Paul H. O'Neill special adviser RAND Corporation trustee trustee
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman and co-founder Unofficial Adviser to Geithner NA NA
Blackstone Group Richard E. Salomon adv. board chair, alt. asset mgt. Council on Foreign Relations member vice chairman
Capital One Patrick W. Gross director Council on Foreign Relations member member
Carver Bancorp Deborah C. Wright chairman & president & CEO Partnership for New York City board member director
CIT Group Jeffrey M. Peek chairman & CEO Partnership for New York City board member director
CIT Group Seymour Sternberg director Council on Foreign Relations member member
CIT Group Seymour Sternberg director Partnership for New York City board member director
Citigroup Alain J.P. Belda director Partnership for New York City board member director
Citigroup C. Michael Armstrong director Council on Foreign Relations member member
Citigroup Judith Rodin director Council on Foreign Relations member member
Citigroup Kenneth T. Derr director Council on Foreign Relations member member
Citigroup Michael B.G. Froman managing director Council on Foreign Relations member member
Citigroup Pamela P. Flaherty director, corporate citizenship Council on Foreign Relations member member
Citigroup Richard D. Parsons chairman Partnership for New York City board member chair emeritus, director
Citigroup Robert E. Rubin director Geithner is Protégé of Rubin NA NA
Citigroup Roberto H. Ramirez director Federal Reserve Bank of New York president int'l advisory board
Fannie Mae Herbert M. Allison Jr. President & CEO Economic Club of New York trustee trustee
Fannie Mae Herbert M. Allison Jr. President & CEO Partnership for New York City board member director
Fortress Inv. Group Richard N. Haass director Council on Foreign Relations member president
Franklin Resources Anne M. Tatlock director Council on Foreign Relations member member
GAMCO Investors Eugene R. McGrath director Economic Club of New York trustee trustee
Goldman Sachs Ashton B. Carter consultant Council on Foreign Relations member member
Goldman Sachs E. Gerald Corrigan managing director Unofficial Adviser to Geithner NA NA
Goldman Sachs James A. Johnson director Council on Foreign Relations member member
Goldman Sachs John C. Whitehead foundation chairman International Rescue Committee trustee trustee
Goldman Sachs Lloyd C. Blankfein chairman & CEO Partnership for New York City board member director
Goldman Sachs Robert D. Hormats vice chairman, GS International Economic Club of New York trustee trustee, vice chair
Goldman Sachs Ruth J. Simmons director Council on Foreign Relations member member
Goldman Sachs Stephen Friedman director Council on Foreign Relations member director
Goldman Sachs Stephen Friedman director Federal Reserve Bank of New York president chair
JPMorgan Chase Andrew D. Crockett executive committee member Group of Thirty member member
JPMorgan Chase Ellen V. Futter director Council on Foreign Relations member member
JPMorgan Chase James Dimon chairman & CEO Federal Reserve Bank of New York president director
JPMorgan Chase James Dimon chairman & CEO Partnership for New York City board member director
JPMorgan Chase Ratan N. Tata international advisory board RAND Corporation trustee trustee
JPMorgan Chase William M. Daley chairman midwest region Council on Foreign Relations member member
M&T Bank Robert G. Wilmers chairman & CEO Council on Foreign Relations member member
Morgan Stanley Frederick B. Whittemore partner & managing director Council on Foreign Relations member trustee
Morgan Stanley John J. Mack chairman & CEO Partnership for New York City board member director
Morgan Stanley Philip Lader senior adviser RAND Corporation trustee trustee
NASDAQ Robert Greifeld president & CEO Partnership for New York City board member director
NYSE Shirley Ann Jackson director Council on Foreign Relations member director
PNC Fin. Services James E. Rohr chairman & CEO RAND Corporation trustee trustee
Popular Richard L. Carrion chairman, president, & CEO Federal Reserve Bank of New York president director
Wells Fargo Donald B. Rice director RAND Corporation trustee trustee
Appendix Table A2
Personal Connections of Timothy Geithner to Financial Firms
The table lists firms to which Timothy Geithner has connections through one or more individuals. The connections are compiled from March 2009 relationship maps on
muckety.com. The connections represent either known connections between Geithner and an individual or potential connections in that Geithner and the individual are
associated with the same organization.
Firm
Base
Sample CAR [0,10] Total Assets ($Bn) Firm CAR [0,10] Total Assets ($Bn)
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. N 0.186 2,175.00 BANK OF AMERICA CORP. 0.168 1,818.00
CITIGROUP INCO. N 0.743 1,938.00 WELLS FARGO & CO 0.124 1,310.00
THE GOLDMAN SACHS GPIN. N 0.192 876.20 FANNIE MAE 1.008 908.50
MORGAN STANLEY N 0.224 658.80 FREDDIE MAC 0.659 835.60
BANK OF NY.MELLON CORP. Y -0.095 237.50 PNC FINL.SVS.GP.INCO. 0.044 291.10
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. N 0.029 122.60 US BANCORP 0.078 265.90
CIT GROUP INCO. Y 0.500 80.45 SUNTRUST BANKS INCO. 0.200 189.10
E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP. Y 0.051 47.50 STATE STREET CORP. 0.091 173.60
BLACKROCK INCO. Y 0.082 19.91 SLM CORP. 0.064 168.80
JEFFERIES GP.INCO. N 0.071 19.60 CAPITAL ONE FINL.CORP. -0.053 165.90
ICAHN ENTERPRISES LP. Y 0.764 18.82 BB&T CORP. -0.131 152.00
NYSE EURONEXT N 0.089 13.28 REGIONS FINL.CORP. -0.206 146.20
THE NASDAQ OMX GP.INCO. Y 0.212 12.05 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP -0.232 119.50
THE BLACKSTONE GROUP LP. Y 0.345 8.41 KEYCORP 0.062 104.50
SIGNATURE BK. Y -0.064 7.11 AMERIPRISE FINL.INCO. 0.297 94.67
LABRANCHE & CO.INCO. Y 0.127 3.73 NORTHERN TRUST CORP. 0.117 82.05
INTERVEST BCSH.CORP. Y -0.259 2.26 COMERICA INCO. 0.037 67.55
STERLING BANC. Y -0.137 2.19 M&T BK.CORP. -0.045 65.82
FINL.FED.CORP. Y 0.277 1.94 MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP. -0.300 62.34
INV.TECH.GP. Y 0.164 1.68 ZIONS BANCORPORATION -0.255 54.61
ALLBERN.HLDG.LP. Y 0.401 1.60 HUNTINGTON BCSH.INCO. -0.073 54.35
MOODY'S CORP. Y 0.114 1.55 HUDSON CITY BANC.INCO. -0.231 54.09
NAT.FINL.PTNS.CORP. Y 0.989 1.52 CHARLES SCHWAB CORP. -0.141 51.17
FORTRESS INV.GP.LLC. Y -0.131 1.17 MF GLOBAL LTD. -0.180 49.18
GFI GROUP INCO. Y -0.278 1.09 CME GROUP INCO. 0.010 48.16
BGC PARTNERS INCO. Y 0.328 1.07 DISCOVER FINANCIAL SVS. 0.122 39.20
OCH-ZIFF CAP.MAN.GP.LLC. Y 0.107 1.02 POPULAR INCO. -0.194 38.53
MSCI INCO. Y 0.090 1.02 SYNOVUS FINL.CORP. -0.031 35.62
BERKSHIRE BANCORP INCO. Y -0.190 0.91 NY.CMTY.BANC.INCO. -0.078 32.33
CARVER BANCORP INCO. Y -0.116 0.79 FIRST HORIZON NAT.CORP. -0.124 31.02
BROADPOINT SECS.GP.INCO. Y 0.204 0.69 THE STUDENT LN.CORP. 0.321 28.14
EVERCORE PARTNERS INCO. Y 0.485 0.68 INTACT.BCK.GP.INCORP. 0.073 28.00
MEDALLION FINL.CORP. Y 0.146 0.65 THE COLO.BANCGROUP INCO. 0.020 25.50
KBW INCO. Y -0.382 0.57 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP -0.056 24.19
GLG PARTNERS INCO. Y -0.012 0.49 BOK FINL.CORP. -0.065 22.73
DUFF & PHELPS CORP. Y 0.438 0.35 ASTORIA FINL.CORP. -0.132 21.98
COHEN & STEERS INCO. Y 0.204 0.28 RAYMOND JAMES FINL.INCO. -0.020 20.62
GREENHILL & CO.INCO. Y -0.064 0.23 PEOPLES UTD.FINL.INCO. -0.174 20.17
MARKETAXESS HDG.INCO. Y 0.040 0.21 FIRST BANC. -0.093 19.49
COWEN GROUP INCORPORATED Y 0.057 0.20 CAPITALSOURCE INCO. 0.135 18.41
CMS BANCORP INCO. Y 0.100 0.20 COMMERCE BCSH.INCO. -0.106 17.53
PZENA INV.MAN.INCO. Y -0.151 0.06 WEBSTER FINL.CORP. 0.067 17.39
EPOCH HOLDING CORP. Y 0.030 0.05 FIRST CTZN.BCSH.INCO. -0.053 16.75
RODMAN & RENSHAW CAP.GP. Y 0.217 0.05 TCF FINANCIAL CORP. -0.026 16.74
SIEBERT FINANCIAL CORP. Y -0.031 0.04 AMERICREDIT CORP. 0.363 16.23
Appendix Table A3
Comparison of New York Firms to Non-New York Firms
The table compares firms in the sample headquartered in New York City with firms in the sample headquartered elsewhere. CAR [0,10] is the cumulative
abnormal return for the firm surrounding the announcement of Geithner as treasury secretary.  Total assets are for the year 2008 from Worldscope.
New York Non-New York (Largest 45)
City National Amcore Financial Wilshire Banc. Stewart Info.Svs. Dollar Financial Comm Bancorp Greene County Banc.
Fulton Financial Fed.Agri.Mge. First Regl.Banc. Oritani Financial Legacy Bancorp Landmark Bancorp LSB Finl.
TD Ameritrade Irwin Finl. Fcstone Group Firstbank Nat.Bankshares Central Jersey Bancorp River Valley Bancorp
Cullen Fo.Bankers First Merchants Ameris Bancorp Centrue Finl. Fox Chase Bancorp Monarch Finl.Hdg. WSB Financial Gp.
Ictl.Ex. Pncl.Finl.Ptns. Lakeland Finl. Horizon Financial Eaton Vance Parke Bancorp Summit State Bank
Valley National Bancorp PMI Group Camden Nat. Mutualfirst Finl. Patriot Nat.BanInc Northeast Bancorp Coml.Nat.Finl.
Flagstar Bancorp Banner Seacoast Bkg.Fla. Alliance Finl. Washington Banking Co. Pamrapo Ban Patriot Cap.Fdg.
Susquehanna Bcsh. 1st Source First Finl. Peapack-Gladstone Finl. Clifton Svg.Banc. Sun American Bancorp Citizens First 
Sth.Finl.Gp. First Busey Cascade Bancorp PAB Bankshares Peoples Finl. Capital Southwest Pathfinder Banc.
UCBH Holdings S & T Bancorp Enter.Finl.Svs. SEI Invs.Co. Unity Bancorp Cmty.Vly.Banc. Liberty Bancorp 
Bancorpsouth Taylor Cap.Gp. United Wstn.Banc. Mrch.Bcsh. WGNB Cowlitz Bancorporation Rome Bancorp 
Sterling Finl. Frontier Finl. Viewpoint Financial Gp. Centerstate Bks.of Fla. Riverview Bancorp BCB Bancorp Cheviot Finl.
KKR Financial Hdg.Llc Dime Cmty.Bcsh. Mercantile Bk. Sierra Bancorp Cmty.Bk.Shs.of Indna. Alliance Bksh. Glen Burnie Bancorp
Whitney Holding Benl.Mut.Banc. Farmers Capital Bk. City Bank 1st.Sth.Banc. Vil.Bk.&.Tst.Finl. Firstcity Finl.
East Ws.Banc. Westamerica Ban Macatawa Bank Horizon Banc. North Vly.Ban Central Banc. Louisiana Bancorp 
Wilmington Tst. Flushing Finl. Penn.Com.Banc. Pulaski Financial 1st.Pactrust Banc. Community Partners Banc. Oak Ridge Finl.Svs.
Legg Mason Chemical Finl. First Cmty.Bcsh. Ctzn.& Nthn. PVF Capital Pico Hdg. Old Line Bcsh.
Wash.Fed. Bancfirst Banctrust Finl.Gp. First Mariner Ban Ames Nat. American River Bksh. MSB Financial 
Cathay Gen.Bancorp Hanmi Finl. Univest of Penn. Hawthorn Bcsh. K-Fed Bancorp First Fed.Bksh. Ezcorp 
Firstmerit First Finl.Banc. Kearny Financial First Security Gp. Federated Invrs. Community Ctl.Bk. Somerset Hills Banc.
UMB Finl. Renasant Ocwen Finl. The 1st.of Lng.Isl. C&F Finl. Encore Cap.Gp. Sanders Mos.Har.Gp.
TFS Financial Heartland Finl.Usa Newbridge Bancorp Colony Bankcorp SI Finl.Gp. The Bank Holdings Monarch Cmty.Banc.
Bank of Hawaii Independent Bk. Fnb United First Financial Nw. Nwh.Thrift Bcsh. 1st Cnt.Ban Thomas Weisel Ptns.Gpin.
Wintrust Financial Sun Bancorp Center Finl. Piper Jaffray Cos. Bridge Bancorp Hampden Bancorp Amer.Phys.Ser.Gp.
Doral Financial Advanta Trico Bcsh. Tennessee Com.Banc. Tradestation Gp. Oneida Finl. Bay National 
Privatebancorp Midwest Banc Hdg. Peoples Banc. 1st.Marblehead Harleysville Svg.Finl. Southcoast Finl. Atlantic Bancgroup 
SVB Financial Group Trustco Bk.Ny ESB Finl. Bofi Holding Monroe Ban Colonial Bksh. First Csh.Finl.Svs.
Trustmark Ampal-Amer.Isr. Cadence Financial German Amer.Banc. Ctzn.Sth.Bkg. Evans Bancorp Optimumbank Hdg.
Pacific Cap.Banc. Bank Mut. Citizens 1st.Banc. Cash Am.Intl. Rainier Pac.Finl.Gp.Inco Chicopee Bancorp Cmty.Shores Bk.
Nat.Penn Bcsh. Wsfs Finl. 1st.Defiance Finl. Appalachian Bcsh. First Nat.Bcsh. NB&T Finl.Gp. Kentucky First Fed.Banc.
1st.Niag.Finl.Gp. First Ste.Ban Knight Capital Gp. Abington Bancorp Hingham Instn.For Svg. First Key.Finl. 1st.Fed.of Nthn.Mi.Banc.
Mgic Investment Integra Bank Finl.Institutions Harrington Ws.Fgp. Herit.Oaks Banc. Magyar Bancorp Bank of Soca.
Franklin Resources First Pl.Finl. Amer.West Ban First Cal.Finl.Gp. Marlin Bus.Svs. Norwood Finl. Mayflower Bancorp 
Prosperity Bcsh. Janus Capital Gp. Smithtown Banc. Enterprise Bancorp Primus Guaranty Ltd. Heritage Financial Group FPB Bancorp 
MB Finl. Tierone Oppenheimer Hdg. Pac.Merc.Ban 1st.Fed.Bcsh.of Ark.Inco 1st.Cmty.Bk.of Am. Safegd.Scientifics 
Umpqua Hdg. Sandy Spring Banc. Oceanfirst Finl. Royal Bcsh.of Penn. Amer.Nat.Bksh. PSB Holdings GS Financial 
Utd.Cmty.Bks. Equifax Parkvale Finl. Princeton Nat.Banc. Community Capital Brooklyn Fed.Banc. Park Bancorp 
First Midwest Banc. Affiliated Mgrs.Gp.Inc Sthn.Cmty.Finl. Bank of Granite Ohio Valley Banc Elmira Svg.Bk.Fsb Triangle Capital 
FNB Bank of The Ozarks The Bancorp Bryn Mawr Bank United Panam Finl. Citizens Cmty.Banc. VSB Bancorp  NY
Corus Bankshares First Finl.Bksh. Northfield Bancorp Credit Accep. Waddell & Reed Finl.Inc Central Va.Bksh. Intersections 
Newalliance Bcsh. Townebank Fidelity Sthn. HMN Financial Bank of Commerce Hdg. North Ctl.Bcsh. Oh.Legacy 
Fid.Nat.Financial Columbia Bkg.Sys. Cardinal Finl. LNB BanInc Citizens Co. First State Finl. Nicholas Financial 
Capitol Fed.Finl. Hampton Roads Bksh. Ste.Banc. Triad Gty. LSB Asta Funding First Bankshares 
Utd.Bksh. Old Second Banc. Arrow Finl. Columbia Bancorp United Security Bcsh. World Acceptance Ffd Finl.
Santander Bancorp Provident Ny.Banc. Porter Bancorp CFS Bancorp Meta Financial Gp. Ameriana Bancorp Main Street Cap.
Old Nat.Banc.(Indiana) Wash.Tst.Banc. Capital Bk. Dearborn Banc. Auburn Nat.BanInc Plumas Banc. Commercefirst Banc.
Radian Gp. First Finl.Hdg. Cascade Finl. Westfield Finl. Ctl.Vly.Cmty.Banc. Mackinac Financial Bank of Mckenney
Bstn.Priv.Finl.Hdg. Independent Bk. Summit Finl.Gp. Pacific Cont. TF Financial Adv.Am.Csh.Adv.Cntrs. Carolina Trust Bank
Hancock Holding Co. Community Tst.Banc. Provident Finl.Hdg. Roma Financial Pac.Premier Banc. Wsb Holdings Am.1st.Tax Exem.Invrs.Lp
Northwest Banc. Green Bankshares Sy Bancorp Cmwl.Bksh. Premier Finl.Bancorp Inc Scty.Nat.Finl. Osage Bancshares 
CVB Financial Simmons First Nat. First Utd. First Ctzn.Banc Home Federal Banc. United Bancorp Oh. QC Holdings 
Moneygram Intl. Mainsource Finl.Gp. TIB Finl. Wainwright Bk.& Tst.Co. Fidelity Ban Sussex Bancorp JMP Group 
Provident Bksh. Southwest Bancorp QCR Hdg. Bank of Marin Bancorp Resource Am. Intl.Assets Investors Title Co.
Provident Finl.Svs. Security Bank First M & F Shore Bcsh. Tidelands Bcsh. Union Bankshares Microfinancial 
1st.Cmwl.Finl. Eurobancshares Consumer Prtf.Svs. Eastern Va.Bksh. Peoples Cmty.Banc. Jacksonvl.Banc.Fla. Cougar Biotech.
Investors Bancorp Lazard Ltd. Suffolk Banc. CNB Finl. Access National First Cap.Bancorp Arbinet Thexchange 
Oriental Finl.Gp. SCBT Financial Encore Bancshares First Finl.Ser. Codorus Vly.Banc. Prvt.Cmty.Bcsh. Westwood Hdg.Gp.
Mastercard First Bancorp Bnc Bancorp Beacon Fed.Banc.In Tower Finl. Newport Bancorp US Global Invrs.
Bankatlantic Banc. T Rowe Price Gp. Metrocorp Bcsh. Center Banc. Sthn.First Bcsh. Sthn.Nat.Banc.of Va.Inco Dia.Hill Inv.Gp.
Capitol Banc.Ltd. Va.Com.Bancorp Bankfinancial Essa Bancorp Timberland Banc. Ntheast.Cmty.Banc. Paulson Cap.
Iberiabank Southside Bcsh. Mbt Finl. Northrim Bancorp Ocean Shore Co. WVS Finl. Arrowhead Resh.
Western Union Co.(The) Cobiz Financial West Ban Atl.Sthn.Finl.Gp. Gamco Investors All.Banc.of (Penn.) Kent Finl.Svs.
Glacier Bancorp Berk.Hills Banc. Bank of Florida Atlantic Cst.Fed. Guaranty Fed.Bcsh. Southern Mo.Banc. Community Bancorp
Penson Worldwide Nara Banc. Compucredit Severn Banc. Bch.First Nat.Bcsh. Abigail Adams Nat.Banc. Bankunited Finl.
Harleysville Nat. Great Sthn.Bancorp Banc.Rhode Isl. Middleburg Finl. Prtf.Rec.Assocs. Britton & Koontz Cap. Benjamin Frank.Banc.Inco
Central Pac.Finl. Lakeland Bancorp Rockville Finl. Compass Diversified Hdg. Rurban Finl. Asset Accep.Cap. W Holding Company 
NBT Bancorp United Cmty.Finl. Yadkin Valley Finl. Optionsxpress Hdg. Community West Bcsh. Broadway Financial Vineyard National Banc.
Wesbanco Brookline Bancorp Stifel Finl. Hopfed Bancorp First Clover Leaf Finl. Lake Shore Bancorp Cape Fear Bank 
Western All.Ban Home Bancshares NASB Finl. Crescent Financial Penns Woods Banc. Wayne Svg.Bcsh. Amer.Cmty.Bcsh.
Cmty.Bk.Sy. Union Bankshares Heritage Com. Ameriserv Finl.Inc First Cmty. Carrollton Banc.
Anchor Banc.Wi. Newstar Financial Temecula Vly.Banc. Coop.Bankshares Amer.Bancorp of Nj. Jeffersonville Bancorp
Texas Capital Bcsh. City Co. Eagle Banc. Rep.First Banc.Inco Carolina Bk.Hdg. Calamos Asset Man.
SWS Gp. West Coast Bancorp Premier West Bancorp Bridge Cap.Hdg. Utd.Bcsh.Ohio Cal.1st.Nat.Bancorp
Sterling Bcsh. Cap.City Bk.Gp. Preferred Bank Heritage Financial New Century Banc. United Community Bancorp
Appendix Table A4
Other Non-New York Firms
The table lists firms in the sample not listed in Appendix Table A4.  The firms are listed in descending order of size (total assets).
Panel A:  Actual returns, Full sample
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
0 11/21/2008 0.093 0.047 0.046 *** 0.096 0.047 0.049 *** 0.089 0.046 0.043 ***
1 11/24/2008 0.165 0.054 0.111 *** 0.185 0.054 0.131 *** 0.107 0.055 0.052 ***
2 11/25/2008 0.032 0.015 0.017 0.047 0.015 0.032 0.033 0.014 0.019
3 11/26/2008 0.087 0.042 0.045 ** 0.076 0.043 0.034 0.085 0.040 0.045 ***
4 11/28/2008 0.051 0.018 0.033 ** 0.054 0.018 0.036 ** 0.021 0.019 0.002
5 12/1/2008 -0.151 -0.083 -0.068 *** -0.165 -0.083 -0.082 *** -0.118 -0.083 -0.034 **
6 12/2/2008 0.054 0.046 0.008 0.058 0.046 0.012 0.086 0.043 0.043 ***
7 12/3/2008 0.045 0.020 0.024 0.056 0.020 0.036 ** 0.035 0.020 0.015
8 12/4/2008 -0.009 -0.014 0.005 -0.003 -0.015 0.011 -0.021 -0.014 -0.008
9 12/5/2008 0.060 0.029 0.031 ** 0.056 0.029 0.027 * 0.054 0.028 0.026 **
10 12/8/2008 0.073 0.027 0.046 ** 0.072 0.028 0.045 ** 0.057 0.027 0.030 **
0-10 (Cumulative) 0.584 0.197 0.387 *** 0.646 0.197 0.448 *** 0.512 0.189 0.323 ***
Panel B:  Cumulative abnormal returns, Full sample
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
0 11/21/2008 -0.016 -0.015 0.000 -0.025 -0.015 -0.010 -0.007 -0.016 0.009
1 11/24/2008 0.046 -0.020 0.066 *** 0.046 -0.020 0.065 *** 0.010 -0.020 0.029 *
2 11/25/2008 0.067 -0.011 0.079 *** 0.080 -0.011 0.091 *** 0.033 -0.011 0.045 **
3 11/26/2008 0.097 -0.002 0.099 *** 0.093 -0.001 0.094 *** 0.069 -0.003 0.072 ***
4 11/28/2008 0.131 0.007 0.124 *** 0.130 0.008 0.121 *** 0.076 0.007 0.069 **
5 12/1/2008 0.120 0.005 0.115 *** 0.120 0.005 0.115 *** 0.083 0.003 0.079 ***
6 12/2/2008 0.110 0.014 0.096 *** 0.107 0.015 0.092 ** 0.113 0.010 0.103 ***
7 12/3/2008 0.112 0.010 0.102 *** 0.116 0.011 0.105 ** 0.111 0.007 0.104 ***
8 12/4/2008 0.149 0.022 0.126 *** 0.163 0.023 0.140 *** 0.130 0.019 0.111 ***
9 12/5/2008 0.150 0.018 0.132 *** 0.154 0.018 0.135 *** 0.133 0.014 0.119 ***
10 12/8/2008 0.161 0.010 0.151 *** 0.157 0.011 0.147 *** 0.136 0.006 0.129 ***
Appendix Table A5
Connections to Geithner and Stock Price Reactions to Treasury Secretary Announcement, Full Sample
The table presents stock returns of financial firms around the announcement of Barack Obama's nomination of Timothy Geithner as Treasury Secretary.
Event day 0 is November 21, 2008 from 3pm (when the news leaked) to market closing; the announcement was made on event day 1. Abnormal returns are
calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. Schedule connections indicate
meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08; personal connections indicate shared board memberships between the firm's executives
and Geithner; New York connections indicate firms headquartered in New York City. Asterisks denote significance levels of a two-tailed t-test (***=1%,
**=5%, *=10%).
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Difference Difference Difference
Difference Difference Difference
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
Geithner Connections (Schedule) 0.046 -0.026 0.072 ** 0.060 0.006 0.054 * 0.064 0.016 0.048
(0.030) (0.033) (0.034)
Geithner Connections (Personal) 0.046 0.006 0.039 0.054 -0.002 0.057 0.054 0.015 0.039
(0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
Geithner Connections (New York) 0.010 -0.015 0.025 0.010 -0.008 0.018 0.015 -0.014 0.029
(0.022) (0.027) (0.027)
Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
Geithner Connections (Schedule) 0.161 0.021 0.140 ** 0.127 -0.013 0.140 *** 0.131 0.087 0.045
(0.066) (0.052) (0.069)
Geithner Connections (Personal) 0.157 0.009 0.149 * 0.115 0.022 0.093 0.115 0.021 0.094
(0.078) (0.068) (0.068)
Geithner Connections (New York) 0.136 0.098 0.038 0.139 0.026 0.112 ** 0.140 0.052 0.088 *
(0.059) (0.054) (0.053)
Panel C: Nonparametric matching estimator
Personal
Geithner Connections 0.0047 *** 0.0238 *** 0.0413 *** 0.022 *** 0.054 *** 0.066 ** 0.050 *** 0.098 *** 0.292 ***
(0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0098) (0.005) (0.009) (0.026) (0.010) (0.021) (0.058)
(7)
Dependent variable is CAR [0]
(Full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is CAR [0,1]
(Base sample)
Dependent variable is CAR [0,10]
(Base sample)
Match on Firm Size
Panel B: Propensity-score matched, CAR [0,10]
Schedule Personal New York Schedule New York Schedule






Match on Primary Control Variables Primary Controls and Others
Appendix Table A6
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Connected Firms, Matching Estimators
The table reports results from various matching estimators. Panels A and B compare cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of firms connected to Geithner with cumulative abnormal
returns of non-connected firms matched by propensity score. The CAR is measured from day 0 to day 1 or from day 0 to day 10, as indicated. Matching is done in one of three
ways, as indicated: by firm size, by the primary control variables (size, profitability, and leverage), or by the primary control variables plus other control variables (a TARP
participation dummy, a deposit-taking dummy, and the CAR surrounding the Lehman collapse). Matching is performed as one-to-one matching without replacement. Panel C
reports the weighted average estimates computed separately for every covariate cell of regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of
Geithner as Treasury Secretary on measures of connections to Geithner. Covariates are quartiles of log of total assets, profitability, and leverage, which results in 64 cells. Controls
for log of total assets, profitability, and leverage are included in each regression. Standard errors are in parentheses, and asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%,
*=10%).
Panel A: Propensity-score matched, CAR [0,1]
Match on Firm Size Match on Primary Control Variables








































































































































































































































































1ST.NIAG.FINL.GP.INCO. 0.05 0.18 0.29 0.52
ADV.AM.CSH.ADV.CNTRS. 0.13 0.13
AFFILIATED MGRS.GP.INC 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.61
ALLBERN.HLDG.LP. 0.16 0.08 0.23 0.48
AMERIPRISE FINL.INCO. 0.07 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.61
ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.18
BANK MUT.CORP. 0.07 0.07
BANK OF HAWAII CORP. 0.05 0.05
BB&T CORP. 0.06 0.06
BROOKLINE BANCORP INCO. 0.16 0.16
CAPITAL ONE FINL.CORP. 0.24 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.52
CAPITOL BANC.LTD. 0.16 0.16
CAPITOL FED.FINL. 0.11 0.11
CASCADE FINL.CORP. 0.03 0.03
CHARLES SCHWAB CORP. 0.04 0.25 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.23 1.00
CHICOPEE BANCORP INCO. 0.44 0.44
CITY BANK 0.05 0.05
CITY NATIONAL CORP. 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.27
CMTY.BK.SHS.OF INDNA. 0.14 0.14
COMERICA INCO. 0.13 0.13
COOP.BANKSHARES INCO. 0.05 0.05
CULLEN FO.BANKERS INCO. 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.36
CVB FINANCIAL CORP. 0.02 0.08 0.10
DOLLAR FINANCIAL CORP. 0.01 0.01
EATON VANCE CORP. 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.64
EQUIFAX INCO. 0.23 0.26 0.18 0.67
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.18 0.17 0.34
FIRST FINL.HDG.INCO. 0.05 0.05
FIRST HORIZON NAT.CORP. 0.02 0.02
FIRSTMERIT CORP. 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.41
FLUSHING FINL.CORP. 0.08 0.08
FPB BANCORP INCO. 0.06 0.06
FRANKLIN RESOURCES INCO. 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.73
FULTON FINANCIAL CORP. 0.08 0.08
HARLEYSVILLE NAT.CORP. 0.07 0.07
HUDSON CITY BANC.INCO. 0.27 0.25 0.51
ICTL.EX.INCO. 0.39 0.19 0.19 0.78
INDEPENDENT BK.CORP. 0.01 0.01
INVESTORS BANCORP INCO. 0.08 0.08
JANUS CAPITAL GP.INCO. 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.25
JEFFERIES GP.INCO. 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.23
KEYCORP 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.23
LEGG MASON INCO. 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.23
M&T BK.CORP. 0.01 0.08 0.10
MARKETAXESS HDG.INCO. 0.14 0.18 0.32
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP. 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.05 0.40
MB FINL.INCO. 0.06 0.02 0.08
NAT.PENN BCSH.INCO. 0.07 0.07
NBT BANCORP INCO. 0.27 0.27
NEWALLIANCE BCSH.INCO. 0.04 0.04
OPTIONSXPRESS HDG.INCO. 0.27 0.04 0.18 0.20 0.70
PEOPLES UTD.FINL.INCO. 0.27 0.21 0.48
PIPER JAFFRAY COS. 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.70
PNCL.FINL.PTNS.INCO. 0.18 0.18
PROSPERITY BCSH.INCO. 0.03 0.06 0.09
RAYMOND JAMES FINL.INCO. 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.33
REGIONS FINL.CORP. 0.05 0.13 0.18
SEI INVS.CO. 0.25 0.03 0.26 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.21 1.31
STIFEL FINL.CORP. 0.11 0.11
SUN BANCORP INCO. 0.06 0.06
SWS GP.INCO. 0.06 0.06
T ROWE PRICE GP.INCO. 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.46
TD AMERITRADE HLDG.CORP. 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.26
TRADESTATION GP.INCO. 0.27 0.21 0.49
TRICO BCSH. 0.10 0.10
TRUSTCO BK.CORP.NY 0.12 0.12
TRUSTMARK CORP. 0.04 0.04
US BANCORP 0.07 0.14 0.27 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.41 0.04 1.14
UTD.BKSH.INCO. 0.21 0.21
WADDELL & REED FINL.INC 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.13
WEBSTER FINL.CORP. 0.13 0.08 0.21
WELLS FARGO & CO 0.30 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.64
WEST COAST BANCORP 0.10 0.10
WHITNEY HOLDING CORP. 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.16
WILMINGTON TST.CORP. 0.10 0.10
WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP. 0.04 0.04
WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORP. 0.12 0.12
ZIONS BANCORPORATION 0.11 0.05 0.16
Sum of smaller weights not listed 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.28
Total weights 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Appendix Table A7
Weights for Synthetic Matching
Treatment Group (Connected Firms)
The table presents the weights used for the control group (non-connected) firms in the synthetic matching estimates.  The weights presented are for the full sample where the treatment group 
is defined as firms connected according to the schedule measure of connections, as in Panel A of Table 5.  Weights less than 0.005 are not reported in the table.
Firm Connected Person Position with Firm Connection to Candidate




BlackRock Laurence D. Fink chairman & CEO Informal Adviser NA NA
Blackstone Group Richard E. Salomon adv. board chair, alt. asset mgt. Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman and co-founder Peterson Institute for International Economics director chairman
Charles Schwab Donald G. Fisher director Teach for America director director
Charles Schwab Paula A. Sneed director Teach for America director director
Citigroup Robert E. Rubin director Summers is Protégé of Rubin NA NA
Citigroup Richard D. Parsons chairman Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Citigroup Judith Rodin director Brookings Institution trustee honorary trustee
Citigroup Anne M. Mulcahy director Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Goldman Sachs James A. Johnson director Brookings Institution trustee honorary trustee
Goldman Sachs John C. Whitehead foundation chairman Brookings Institution trustee honorary trustee
Goldman Sachs Richard A. Friedman managing director Mount Sinai Medical Center (New York) trustee trustee
Goldman Sachs Suzanne Nora Johnson senior director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Goldman Sachs Abby Joseph Cohen senior investment strategist Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Icahn Enterprises Carl C. Icahn owner Mount Sinai Medical Center (New York) trustee trustee
JP Morgan Chase George P. Shultz chairman international council American Corporate Partners adv. council member adv. council member
JP Morgan Chase William M. Daley chairman Midwest division Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
JP Morgan Chase Ernesto Zedillo int'l advisory board member Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Lazard Vernon E. Jordan Jr. director Brookings Institution trustee honorary trustee
Morgan Stanley Laura D'Andrea Tyson director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Morgan Stanley Laura D'Andrea Tyson director Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Morgan Stanley Hutham S. Olayan director Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Morgan Stanley Laura D'Andrea Tyson director Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
NASDAQ Glenn H. Hutchins director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
NYSE Shirley Ann Jackson director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Och-Ziff David Windreich partner Mount Sinai Medical Center (New York) trustee trustee
Sallie Mae Barry A. Munitz director Broad Foundations governor governor
VISA Suzanne Nora Johnson director Brookings Institution trustee trustee
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman & co-founder Concord Coalition director founding president
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman & co-founder Japan Society life director life director
Blackstone Group Peter G. Peterson chairman & co-founder Peterson Institute for International Economics director chairman
Blackstone Group Richard E. Salomon adv. board chair, alt. asset mgt. Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Capital One Patrick W. Gross director Aspen Institute lifetime trustee trustee
CIT Group James S. McDonald director Japan Society life director director
Citigroup Richard D. Parsons chairman Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Citigroup Robert E. Rubin director Concord Coalition director director
Citigroup Anne M. Mulcahy director Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Goldman Sachs Stephen Friedman director Aspen Institute lifetime trustee trustee
Goldman Sachs John C. Whitehead foundation chairman Financial Services Volunteer Corps honorary chairman co-founder & chairman
Goldman Sachs John C. Whitehead foundation chairman International House chairman honorary trustee
Goldman Sachs Josef Joffe foundation member Aspen Institute lifetime trustee member
Goldman Sachs E. Gerald Corrigan managing director Group of Thirty chairman of the board member
Goldman Sachs Henry Cornell managing director Japan Society life director director
JPMorgan Chase William M. Daley chairman Midwest division Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
JPMorgan Chase William H. Gray III director Concord Coalition director director
JPMorgan Chase Andrew D. Crockett executive committee member Group of Thirty chairman of the board member
JPMorgan Chase Ernesto Zedillo int'l advisory board member Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Moody's Henry A. McKinnell Jr. director Japan Society life director life director
Morgan Stanley Laura D'Andrea Tyson director Obama-Biden economic advisory team member member
Morgan Stanley Hutham S. Olayan director Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Morgan Stanley Laura D'Andrea Tyson director Peterson Institute for International Economics director director
Morgan Stanley Frederick B. Whittemore partner/managing director Aspen Institute lifetime trustee trustee
NASDAQ Merit E. Janow director Japan Society life director director
NYSE James S. McDonald director Japan Society life director director
NYSE Self senior vice president (former) NA NA NA
Bank of New York Gerald L. Hassell president New York Philharmonic director emeritus director
Fannie Mae Philip A. Laskawy chairman New York Philharmonic director emeritus director
Goldman Sachs Self chairman & CEO (former) NA NA NA
Goldman Sachs John F. W. Rogers partner & foundation trustee Corzine's former chief of staff NA NA
Lazard Philip A. Laskawy director New York Philharmonic director emeritus director
US Bancorp Jerry W. Levin director New York Philharmonic director emeritus director
Panel D: Jon Corzine
Appendix Table A8
Personal Connections of Other Treasury Secretary Candidates to Financial Firms
The table lists firms to which other Treasury Secretary candidates have connections through one or more individuals. The connections are compiled from March 2009 relationship maps on
muckety.com. The connections represent either known connections between the candidate and an individual or potential connections in that the candidate and the individual are associated with
the same organization.
Panel A: Lawrence Summers
Panel B: Paul Volcker
Panel C: Sheila Bair
Panel A:  Actual returns, Base sample
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
0 1/14/2009 -0.054 -0.029 -0.025 -0.053 -0.029 -0.024 -0.054 -0.028 -0.027 **
1 1/15/2009 -0.008 0.000 -0.009 -0.024 0.001 -0.025 0.020 -0.001 0.021 **
2 1/16/2009 0.005 -0.002 0.007 -0.011 -0.002 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
3 1/19/2009 -0.119 -0.061 -0.058 ** -0.070 -0.062 -0.009 -0.076 -0.061 -0.015
0-3 (Cumulative) -0.169 -0.090 -0.079 ** -0.145 -0.091 -0.054 -0.110 -0.090 -0.020
4 1/20/2009 0.071 0.039 0.032 0.101 0.038 0.062 ** 0.085 0.036 0.049 ***
Panel B:  Cumulative abnormal returns, Base sample
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
0 1/14/2009 -0.014 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 -0.018 -0.006 -0.012
1 1/15/2009 -0.024 -0.007 -0.018 -0.034 -0.007 -0.028 0.000 -0.008 0.008
2 1/16/2009 -0.029 -0.014 -0.015 -0.056 -0.014 -0.042 -0.010 -0.015 0.005
3 1/19/2009 -0.085 -0.039 -0.046 -0.056 -0.040 -0.016 -0.028 -0.041 0.013
4 1/20/2009 -0.066 -0.030 -0.037 -0.014 -0.031 0.017 0.009 -0.034 0.043 **
Panel C:  Actual returns, Full sample .
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
0 1/14/2009 -0.058 -0.032 -0.026 ** -0.063 -0.032 -0.031 ** -0.059 -0.031 -0.028 ***
1 1/15/2009 -0.026 -0.003 -0.023 * -0.051 -0.003 -0.048 *** 0.007 -0.005 0.012
2 1/16/2009 -0.011 -0.003 -0.009 -0.031 -0.002 -0.029 ** -0.006 -0.003 -0.003
3 1/19/2009 -0.145 -0.066 -0.078 *** -0.132 -0.067 -0.065 *** -0.091 -0.068 -0.023 *
0-3 (Cumulative) -0.217 -0.101 -0.116 *** -0.243 -0.101 -0.142 *** -0.140 -0.103 -0.037 *
4 1/20/2009 0.130 0.043 0.087 *** 0.148 0.043 0.105 *** 0.104 0.042 0.063 ***
Panel D:  Cumulative abnormal returns, Full sample
Event Day Date Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn. Conn. Non-Conn.
0 1/14/2009 -0.013 -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 -0.007 -0.008 -0.018 -0.006 -0.012
1 1/15/2009 -0.041 -0.011 -0.030 * -0.068 -0.010 -0.058 *** -0.013 -0.012 -0.001
2 1/16/2009 -0.064 -0.020 -0.044 ** -0.111 -0.018 -0.093 *** -0.028 -0.021 -0.007
3 1/19/2009 -0.137 -0.047 -0.091 *** -0.166 -0.046 -0.120 *** -0.055 -0.050 -0.005
4 1/20/2009 -0.067 -0.037 -0.031 -0.083 -0.036 -0.047 * -0.004 -0.041 0.037 **
Appendix Table A9
Connections to Geithner and Stock Price Reactions to Tax Problems
The table presents stock returns of financial firms around the announcement of Geithner's tax errors and delayed confirmation hearing. Event day 0 is January
14, 2009; the tax problems were disclosed by the Senate Finance Committee on January 13, 2009 after market closing. Abnormal returns are calculated using
the market model with an estimation window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly
correlated to Citigroup or Bank of America.  Schedule connections denote the number of meetings between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08; 
personal connections denote the number of shared board memberships between the firm's executives and Geithner; New York connections indicate firms
headquartered in New York City.    Asterisks denote significance levels of a two-tailed t-test (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Difference Difference Difference
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Difference Difference Difference
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Difference Difference Difference
Difference Difference Difference
Schedule Connections Personal Connections New York Connections
Geithner Connections -0.002 -0.010 0.014 -0.003 *** -0.005 0.016 0.001 0.004 0.026 * -0.001 0.005 0.032 **
(0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) (0.002) (0.006) (0.014)
Number of firms 515 515 515 583 583 583 515 515 515 583 583 583
R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.116 0.113 0.115 0.113 0.113 0.116 0.209 0.209 0.213
Geithner Connections (Schedule) -0.020 -0.048 -0.014 -0.002 -0.031 * 0.016 -0.051 ** -0.081 -0.044 * -0.056 *** -0.173 *** 0.012
     Confidence interval (2.5%) -0.035 -0.108 -0.040 -0.018 -0.035 -0.028 -0.040 -0.126 -0.049 -0.021 -0.046 -0.033
     Confidence interval (97.5%) 0.042 0.094 0.050 0.032 0.046 0.040 0.072 0.142 0.078 0.055 0.080 0.066
Number of firms 515 507 513 583 570 574 515 507 513 583 570 574
Number in treatment group 10 2 8 22 9 13 10 2 8 22 9 13
Dependent variable is CAR [0,1] Dependent variable is CAR [0,3]
Base sample Full sample Base sample Full sample
(12)
Dependent variable is CAR [0,1] Dependent variable is CAR [0,3]
Appendix Table A10
Connections to Geithner and Reactions to Tax Problems, OLS and Synthetic Matching Estimates
The table reports estimates of the effect of connections to Geithner on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of Geithner's tax problems. Panel A reports OLS estimates and
Panel B reports synthetic matching estimates. Event day 0 is January 14, 2009; the tax problems were disclosed by the Senate Finance Committee on January 13, 2009 after market closing. In Columns 1 to 6,
the CAR is measured from day 0 to day 1, and in Columns 7 to 12, the CAR is measured from day 0 to day 3. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model with an estimation window of 250
trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0. The base sample excludes firms with returns highly correlated to Citigroup or Bank of America. Schedule connections denote the number of meetings
between the firm's executives and Geithner during 2007-08; personal connections denote the number of shared board memberships between the firm's executives and Geithner; New York connections indicate
firms headquartered in New York City. "Highly connected" indicates more than two meetings, "Mildly connected" indicates one or two meetings. In Panel A, control variables (not reported) include cubics in
size (log of total assets), profitability (return on equity), and leverage (total debt to total capital) as of 2008; robust standard errors, adjusted for pre-event correlations between firms, are below coefficients in
parentheses. In Panel B, the matching window is the 250 days ending 30 days prior to event day 0; confidence intervals for hypothesis testing of the effect of Geithner connections being equal to zero are
computed according to 5,000 placebo simulations.  Asterisks denote significance levels (***=1%, **=5%, *=10%).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (8) (9) (10) (11)(5) (6) (7)
Base sample Full sample Base sample Full sample
Panel A: OLS estimates
Schedule Personal New York New YorkSchedule
Panel B: Synthetic matching estimates
New York Schedule Personal New York PersonalPersonal Schedule
All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn. All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn. All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn. All Conn. Highly Conn. Mildly Conn.
